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The historical s uccess or failure of any policy is
measured by the actual outcome of events, but that
success or failure is not determined by prescience
or wisdom, by right or wrong.
The course of
history, of victory and defeat, is circumscribed by
the
fortuitous
confluence
of
resources and
opportunity.
--L. Dawidowicz
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PREFACE

On

July 14, 1936, the French people celebrated

of the French Revolution with exceptional optimism.
of France,

headed

months before.
the

by

the

anniversary

The Popular Front

the socialist L~n Blum, had been elected two

Its primary support, the workers,

were confident

new government's willingness to alleviate their mounting poverty.

Within six weeks of ooaUng to power, the Popular Front proved
able

in

to

negotiate with employers

and

union

significant Matignon labor reform agreements.
Parisians

itself

leaders with

the

More than one million

including Blum and his cabinet marched past the monument of

the Commune, up the Rue de Rivoli, towards the Place de la Nation,
al ternately singing

the

"Marseillaise"

and

the

"Internationale,"

waving banners of "Vive Blum", "Vive Ie Front Populaire."l
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"Never, "
political

wrote

and

the

literary

edi tors

of

the

Vendredi,

a

left-wing

weekly, "was the Place so beautiful. ,,2 Blum,

fist raised, preceded his ministers on the podium, over a huge
of

Jean Jaur€s

subtitled

addressed "workers, people
small

investors,

together":

revolutionary

of

the

shopkeepers ,
this

"On

chant:

with War!

"Down

Long

countryside,

Live

small

poster

Peace!" He

proprietors,

that

the

Popular Front has gathered

14,

let

us

day July

swear

to

uphold

the

'Friends, let us always remain united' (Applause

and bravos) ••• The will to unity must rest among us as the rule and the
pact. ,,3 The Vendredi captured the enthusiasm of the audience:
Saint-Just said happiness was a new idea. Today in
the Paris ~ir, we breathed the novelty and birth of
that idea.
Four

days

delegation of

later,

in

teachers

and

the Hotel Matignon,

meeting with

union leaders, Blum received a dispatch

from the French Ambassador in Spain reporting that a
had

a

military

revolt

erupt~ in Spanish Morocco. 5 "There are new complications ahead,"

Blum told the delegation.

nIf we succeed in what v.ve are

undertaking ,

no one will be able to say that events made our task any easier. ,,6
On

July

20,

./

the

Premier of the Spanish Republic, Jose Giral,

sent Blum a telegram for arms and
older

Spain's Frente Popular,

than France ' s by only a few weeks, seemed to be a natural ally.

Was Blum
government

to
was

aid
in

the

Spanish Republlc?

keeping

after Germany and Italy, a
menace

planes.

with
third

to France's security.

Assisting

international law.
potentially

a

legitimate

Strategically,

hostile

front

was

a

Yet at the same time, the Popular Front

had itself sworn to "defend' dezoocratic liberties • •• and to

give peace

3

to

the world's

hurnanity.,,7 Blum bnmediately met with his cabinet on

the 20th and in fact did approve a shipment of planes.

However within

two weeks, he was to put forth a policy of "nonintervention" in Spain,

and to call for the other

European powers,

primarily England,

the

USSR, Italy, and Germany to abide by it.

Why did Blum respond the way he did?

"All his life," wrote Joel Colton, a distinguished biographer of
Blum,

"his

socialism and his republican patriotism were fused into a

single mold." In Blum's speeches, actions and

later

attempted

consistency of the two

to

demonstrate

the

harmony and

testimonies

"he

ideals. ,,8
How did Blum,
responsibility

to

then,

adapt

France ' s

his

national

republican
defense,

patriotism,
to his

socialist principles of internationalism, and pacifism in

and

long-held
the

crisis

of the Spanish Civil War?
Was the government personally responsible for the choice?
Blum's

humanist,

denx:>cratic socialism was directly inspired by

Jaures's harmony of socialism and patriotism.

But had

the

world

climate of 1936 rendered this harmony obsolete? As Blum's most recent
-biographer, Jean Lacouture, put
conflict between

~rialisms

it,

how

could Blum

"identify the

of 1914 with the unilateral threat which

Nazism represented?,,9
Finally,

did Blum have any viable alternatives in dealing with

Spain? Was nonintervention avoidable?
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Keeping these questions in mind,
Blum's

response

to

this

the Spanish Civil War.

study will

investigate

Contemporaries and later

scholars have differed in their assessments of this response.
First, Blum's most recent
maintain

that

his

fear

biographers,

Colton and Lacouture,

of taking risks prevented him fram taking a

strong stance in support of the Spanish Republic.
of

his

duties

Blum's perception

as a democratic leader within a coalition government

were reinforced by his personal qualities.

Writes Colton, "his desire

not to offend political allies or even strong opponents, his
conciliator

and

advocate of

compromise,

role

as

his strong sense of moral

integrity, his faith in the integrity of others" limited Blum's vision
of alternatives to nonintervention. lO Colton and Lacouture accuse Blum
of a naive and misguided faith in the cooperation of national leaders,
borne of his socialist ideals.

The

nonintervention policy embodies

the tragedy of this faith.
To other contemporaries and Blum, the nonintervention policy was

the

only alternative to civil war in France.

Anthony Eden related in

his memoirs an interview with the Portuguese Foreign Minister,
Monteiro,

who

Senhor

had corne away fram France "apprehensive." "He would be

much relieved if France got through the next few months without
serious

internal conflict." "Monteiro," Eden went on, "was one of the

first to think that France might be
within

some

shattered,

because

the

hatreds

the country were greater than the hatred of same Frenchmen for

the foreign enemy."il
WOuld a majority of the French have followed

Blum

into Spain?

Blum said it was impossible for him to risk war without the consent of

5

public opinion. 12 But according to Blum's former Minister of Aviation,
the working

class

unquestionnably

"would have willingly given up the advent of an

just social legislation

to

help

the

Spanish

Republic.,,13
Thirdly,

still other

historians view Blum's policy from the

perspective of dissension within the Popular Front itself.
argues,

for

participate

example,

that since

in the cabinet,

Lacouture

the Communist Party refused to

Blum's political

stand depended on

alliance with the more moderate Radical Party.
When one considers that the t\',Q most influential
Radical ministers in the circumstances,
the
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Delbos) and the
Minister of National Defense (Daladier), became,
respectively the symbol and the defender of
nonintervention, it is justifiable to say that in
the Spanish affair, the Radical party, half the
Popular Front on the governmental level, exercised
an invincible force of obstruction. Any policy
claiming to provide long-term aid for the Spanish
Republic would obviously have led to a cabinet
crisis and a breaking of the Popular Front
"contract." l4
Hew "obvious" was the threat of the Radical Party?
Fourthly, same explain that Blum advocated nonintervention aware
that

a

rebel victory was likely, that Italy and Germany would have

sent more

arms

to Spain anyway,

and

establishment supported the Franquists.
strategic threat?
military, and did

that the French mili tary

Did Blum accurately gauge the

How much authority did Blum exert over
this

affect his decision?

"While prepared

the
to

justify his policy in terms of military exigencies, it seems unlikely
he was so susceptible to their dictates, " observes historian Robert
Young.

He adds a "stunning fact":

6

••• in this crucial three-week period, preceding the
nonintervention decision, the government failed to
consult the French chiefs of staff on the precise
nature of the strategic menace or on the ki~s of
operations which could be mounted against it.
The last prevailing argument
forced

nonintervention on France.

is

that

the British government

"Rightly or wrongly," wrote Pierre

Cot,"it looked as if the non-intervention policy v-uuld be the only way
of preventing England
others,
confirmed

such as
this

hostility of

from aiding Franco."16 On the other

hand,

the British Minister in Paris, Hugh Lloyd Thomas,
rU£l'K)r was goverrunent-directed,

to

"appease

the

the extreme elements within their country, which looked

like getting them into international complications. ,,17

This thesis will

an~wer

the above questions

in an attempt

to

assess the major reasons for Blum's response to the Spanish Civil War.
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CHAPI'ER 1

Overview of the Origins of French Nonintervention
in the Spanish Civil War

I remember once saying to Arthur Koestler, IIHistory
stopped in 1936, II at which he nodded in irrmediate
understanding.
We were both
thinking
of
totalitarianism in general, but more particularly
of the Spanish Civil war
- G. Orwell l
liThe Spanish affair had for me the character of a veritable
theatrical coup,"

./

recalled Leon Bltnn,

the Socialist head of the

Popular Front in France, elected just forty days before the outbreak
of Civil War in Spain. 2 The Spanish Civil War was to became the
central foreign policy
1936-1938.

Minister

issue of

the Popular Front

in the years

of Aviation, Pierre Cot, later interpreted the

unfolding crisis to have been "the first act of the European war .113
In 1936, a general election in Spain brought to power the Frente
Popular, a coalition government of the left similar to that of France.
Spain, however, lacking the Republican tradition of France am only
precariously maintaining a democracy since 1931, began to experience
instability.4 A military uprising, long in preparation, ignited on the
immediate pretext of the assassination of a rightist leader on July

8

13,

1936.

July 18,

On

General Franco flew to Morocco to assume

cormtand of the rebel forces, and on

the

same day,

Moroccan

trCX>ps

began to arr i ve on the Spanish Mainland.
On

Monday,

July

20,

from the

Spanish

head of

Blum found a yell<:M telegram on his desk
goverrnnent,

dangerous military coup,

ask

you

JOs({ Giral:

to arrange

"Surprised

by

immediately with us

supplies of weap:::>ns and planes. Fraternally yours, Giral. 115
The request was not problematic.
under

siege. 6 In addition,

agreement with Spain
materiel

to Madrid

was

the Laval goverrnnent had signed a trade

"providing
up

A legitbnate goverrnnent

for

the

delivery of French

war

to the value of 20 million francs.,,7 Between

July 20 and 22 Blum had met with Minister of Defense Edouard Daladier;
Pierre Cot; Yvon Delbos, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and with Vincent
Auriol, Minister of Finance.
request,

noting

All agreed to comply pranptly with

the

the danger that would arise from a new fascist state

in Europe.
Ambassador Carde'iYas, a supporter
when he

learned

of

the Franquists,

the French goverrnnent was

to

resigned

send planes

anmunition to the Republicans. 8 Already, the French senate was
with

"serious

"precedent it
themselves

in

emotion"
would
the

against

set"

for

sending

other

the

nations

arms,

and
beset

because of the

to likewise embroil

conflict, noted the adjunct director of p:::>litical

affairs to the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 9
Once Carden~.s had violated
rightist

press

reacted

to

the

the Popular Front I s

secrecy,

news with predictable hostility.

L'Action Francaise and L'Echo de Paris had already taken the

3

the

side of

9

the catholic

and anti-Cammunist

rebels.

"Will the French Popular

Front dare to arm the Spanish Popular Front?,"

demanded L'Echo de

Paris. 10
While

the news of the Popular Front ' s sale of Potez planes to

the Spanish government reached the Parliament and the press, Blum had
left for London on July 22 to discuss Hitler's remilitarization of the
Rhineland,

and

the Belgian request

agreements and declare neutrality.

to drop out of

A French reporter, Pertinax, asked

Blum whether he was going to seoo arms to Spain.
the affirmative, Pertinax warned, "You know that
viewed

the Locarno

When Blum replied in
that

is not well

here."ll Although Spain was never officially discussed at the

talks, eleven years later, Blum told the parliamentary Investigative
Commission that

Secreta~y

of State

in the Foreign Office, Anthony

Eden, privately cautioned him to be "prudent.,,12
Blum returned to Paris the evening of
political clbnate

the

in France had changed.

24th

Both

the

to find

the

leftist and

rightist press expressed their own positions on the civil war in Spain
and on the extent to which France should react.
in Parliament also voiced their concerns.
with an

"ovation"

raised fists , noted

The

representatives

French workers greeted Blum

at the airport, singing the "Internationale" with
the Socialist newspaper, Le Populaire. 13 The

President of the Senate, Jules J eanneney, however, was more somber:
How can you do that? No one here understands. It
is not a political question, we are not looking for
an excuse to oppose you, but the idea that you are
getting us involved in an enterprise of which we
know not the consequences, the idea that we might
be led into a war for Spain, while last March 7, we
hesitated and finally retreated when the issue
involved military reoccupation of the Rhineland, a

10

more direct and immediate issue of security to
France, that is something here
no one can
understand.
On what conditions will you get
involved there? We knav in London - I do not say
your position is disapproved -- but we know here
that if there were to be any
international
ccmplications
our intervention, England would
not support us.

£¥

The President of the Chamber, Edouard Herriot,
not to "meddle" in Spain's affairs. lS
On

Saturday,

meetings on Spain.
proceed with

July

2S,

It became more

and

the first of three cabinet

more

difficult

for

him

to

the open arms sales in the face of mounting opposition.

The hesitating cabinet discussed
sales

Blum held

likewise warned Blum

though Mexico.

the possibility of discreet

arms

According to Jiminez de Asua, assistant to the

new Ambassador, Britain was pressuring France

to

remain neutral. 16

Ambassador Alvaro de AlbOrnoz and Fernando de los Rios, however, were
convinced that Blum must remain in office, and proposed tearing up the
check already submi tted in payment to the Ministry of War,
presence.

Asua

opposed this, explaining that a socialist opposition

in Parliament would
presence

be much more

influential

in the coalition government.

eventually won, however.
in wanting

to

in Blum's

than

the Socialist

The Ambassador and de los Rios

The Spanish diplomats were not as

keep Blum

unanlinous

in paver as same historians have tried to

argue. 17
Negrin, the leader of the Spanish Republic,
account.

According

to him,

the French

gives

"informed

a

different

the Spanish

Government that their (the Popular Front's) resignation would depend
on what we

(the Spanish government) considered most useful and most

11

favorable for our struggle and our cause,"
ministers discussed

The Spanish government

the possible consequences of a Blum resignation.

Everyone - except for me (Negrin) -- was convinced
that the war would last for a few days, or at most
for a few weeks. Everyone - myself included believed that the replacement of
the Blum
government could be fatal for us, less because of
the difficulties in obtaining arms ••• than because
of the consequences which a ccx:>ling, or worse a
reversal of France's sympathetic attitude toward
Spain might have on the international situation,
which might, in a short
time,
produce the
strangling of the Republic. Later, when we learned
that the solution had been in accordance with our
wishes, we bre~~hed freely and carmented on our
narrow escape.
With or

without

the

nonintervention proposal, Lacouture concludes,

"What remains is the uncertainty that in
Spanish Republicans,

uncertain friends

the eyes of most of

the

in Paris were better than

opponents. ,,19
According to Cot, "The possibility of denouncing
which allowed

the

treaty

the Spanish government to buy arms in France was never

considered for a manent at the meeting of July 25.,,20

If

so

the

following day's cabinet press release contradicts him:
The French government, after the deliberations of
the cabinet, has unaniIrously decided not to
intervene in the internal conflicts of Spain. This
position,
proposed by M.
Yvon Delbos, was
unanimouslyawroved. Finally, on the question of
the supply of war materiel which the Spanish
government is said to have requested, it was
declared in official circles at the conclusion of
the cabinet meeting: it is false that the French
government has affirmed i2f determination to follow
a policy of intervention.
The Spanish government
implies an armed

"is said" to have requested? The carmuniqu{

"intervention"

Spain was not

calling for.

The

""-

12
cabinet

resolved,

according

to Cot,

to

use

the eight-day period

necessary for collecting the shipment of arms requested by the Spanish
government, to debate on foreign policy in the Chamber,
England might

learn of

the

and

so

that

true danger of a fascist government in

. hOOrIng
.
. 22 ForeIgn
. MInIs
. , t er Delbos ,
neIg
SpaIn.

however,

conscious of

and Parliamentary objections, became a bona-fide supporter of

British

partial nonintervention.
meeting,

he

On

July

26,

the

day after

the

cabinet

sent a telegram to Vincent Auriol, the Finance Minister,

forbidding all exports of war materiel to Spain. 23

The

first

steps

toward an all-inclusive policy of nonintervention had been taken.
July

On

30,

news

reached

the Quai d' Or say that two Italian

planes secretly headed to aid Franco were accidentally found
Morocco. 24

Some

were

apparently ordered July 17,

east of

before

the

uprising.25 Blum felt more "at ease"; this proof of intervention freed
him from rightist warnings that Italian action was provoked by French
aid
to the Republicans. 26 He went before the Foreign Affairs
Commission of the Senate announcing that if Germany and Italy overtly
aided

the

rebels,

Republicans.
action"

continue

to

sell

arms

But instead of assuring the Popular Front

(since

rightist press

France \\Quld

Italy had

"started

remained violently

it"),

against

the

the

"freedan of

Parliament

selling

to

arms.

and the

Charles

Maurras of L'Action Franlaise argued that the intervention of other
countries in Spain gave France no right
provoke

international war.

to

similarly

He and other reporters, framthe left as

well as the right, feared an ideological conflict of the
the

intervene and

"whites and

reds" in Spain \\Quld provoke and highlight the dissensions within

each European country.27

l3

On August 31, the deputies debated,
generals

some claiming the

rebel

"were fighting the attempt to sovietize their country. ,,28 At

the second cabinet meeting of August 1, Delbos informed Blum that
British still preferred

the

the Franco forces, and that in the name of

Anglo-French amity, they advised that strict neutrality be observed. 29
While Blum continued to assert, "Our duty requires that we
our Spanish

friends,

whatever

be,,,30 a ~romise was
retain some

the consequences of this support may

eventually proposed whereby France would

"freedom of action" to send shipnents if the Germans and

Italians continued to intervene.
appeal

aid

Delbos proposed

to send out an

to the European nations which would lead to the adoption of

"corrmon rules of nonintervention.,,31 This plan had first
by Alexis Leger of the Foreign Office.

formulated

been

Leger felt it was

"the best available insurance against the spread of the conflict. u32
The British replied favorably on August 4, asking that all
European powers

be

incorporated

into

this agreement.

received a "vague" response

fran Germany on

advanced

that

a new

rewording

the

5th,

the

France only
and

Delbos

all governments prohibit "direct or

indirect exports, reexportation and transit, going to Spain, Spanish
possessions and Spanish Morocco I all arms, muni tions and mater ials of
war,

as

well

as

aircrafts,

assembled or

disassembled,

and

all

formulating

the

warships. ,,33
At

the

same

time

the

diplomats were

nonintervention policy, Cot, Daladier, and Jules Mach continued to
send arms and planes

to Spain over Deltx:>s ' s . author i ty • Blum was

trying to persuade his colleague of the British Labour Party,

David

14
Noel-Baker,

to attempt in turn to influence the British admiralty of

the danger of a Frariquist victory to both countries.

Blum also

sent

Admiral Darlan to attempt to convince Lord Chatfield, First Admiral,
of these dangers and to propose France and Britain mediate between the
two sides in

Spain.

Chatfield said he

WaS

unaware of Darlan's

strategic information.

While wanting to keep channels open to any new
information, he rejected Darlan's proposal. 34
Darlan,

in his

account,

said he told Chatfield that neither

fascism nor corrmunism would be favorable in Spain; "the best solution
for Anglo-French interests would be a democratic goverrnnent in Madr id,
inclusive of different elements of the population.,,35 Yet Chatfield on
his side recorded Darlan to have said "anxiously" that France "did not
wish either a Fascist or
other

seemed

~ammunist

inevitable

Government in Spain, yet one

~

the

(emphasis mine). ,,36 Evidently, conservative

Britain and the Popular Front perceived the ramifications of the Civil
War differently.

The British essentially sought neutrality.37

The failure of the Darlan mission had a "considerable influence"
on Blum. 38 He had another reason to feel
"abandoned":
only
Czechoslovakia

and

the Soviet Union sympathized with the Loyalists to

the point of consider ing active aid.
press

reflected,

French public opinion,

became more deeply divided.

meeting on August 8, Blum was tempted to resign,

as

the

By the third cabinet
but was urged

to

remain in power by de los Rios and Asua. 39
On August

7 Sir George Clerk, British Ambassador to France,

spoke with Delbos to review plans for nonintervention.

At that point

no clear word had yet arr i ved from Germany, and Delbos said in view of

15

the "already known provision of Italian aircraft to the insurgents and
of

the despatch of twenty-eight German aeroplanes from Hamburg to the

same destination," France would go through with sending out
Dewoitine aircraft already ordered.

the

five

Nevertheless, Clerk warned Delbos

that Britain could not guarantee her involvement if France were sucked
into the Spanish war:
I concluded the interview by expressing the hope
that the French Government, even though, pending an
agreement of nonintervention, they might feel
themselves
precluded
from
stopping
private
commercial transactions with Spain would do what it
could to limit and retard such transactions as much
as p::>ssible. I asked M. Deloos to forgive me for
speaking so frankly and I repeated that all I had
said was entirely personal and on my own
rep::>nsibility but I felt that in so critical a
situation I must put before him the danger of any
action which might definitely commit the French
government to one side of the conflict and make
more difficult' the cooperation between o~ two
countries which was called for by this crisis. 0
Clerk had a marked affect on DelOOs, as he revealed on August 7,
at the fateful third and final cabinet meeting on
summer. 41 The

cabinet

it.

DelOOs

nON proposed

and Cot as

illusions
a

He

sent such an

to Auriol on the 9th and never rescinded it. 42 The meeting with

Clerk and the failure of

in

firmly

suspending, "wi thout exception,"

commercial as well as military aircraft to Spain.
order

that

became firmly divided, with Deloos on the one

hand convinced of the wisdom of nonintervention,
against

intervention

the Darlan mission

left Deloos with no

about British support for France should she became involved

conflict over Spain.

nonintervention.

He

even

He

was

threatened

nON

commdtted

to

total

to resign and pr0voke a
ministerial crisis if the plan was not adopted. 43 For all intents and

16
the embargo had now became a unilateral French action.

purposes

Many

critics have seen the embargo itself as intervention. 44
August 15,

On

the policy was officially endorsed

Britain but Germany and
maneuvers

in Spain.

Great

by

Italy vacillated, buying time to continue

Ironically,

agreement because she did not

Germany eventually signed

the

think she could compete against the

combined forces of France, Britain, and the USSR. 45
Delbos reasoned the fascists could intervene more effectively.
Why did he think so?

In the London Times, same months before leaving

office in 1938, Delbos explained
goverrunent,

which had hardly

it was
initiated

"known

its gigantic rearmament

program, was determined to pursue a policy of
But although

determined , neither

that the British

strictest neutrality.

to follow nor

support France by

furnishing arms, it was prepared to join with her in the enforcement
of nonintervention.,,46
A

European

Nonintervention

Committee

September in London to enforce the policy.
schemes
observed

for
by

unproducti ve.

supervising an arms
all

It attempted

to

in

devise

embargo on Spain that could be

interested powers.

The Corrmittee,

was established

But

the

deliberations were

historian Dreifort writes,

served as a useful diplomatic safety valve anO a smoke

"merely

screen behind

which intervention occurred.,,47 Mussolini especially made no secret of
the arms and "volunteers" he was sending to Spain.
The policy of nonintervention predictably began to fall apart,
having been violated from the start.
attacked

by

A German ship, the Kamerun,

was

the Spanish coast guard and forbidden to dock on August

'- I

17
18; to France's and Br i tain' s relief, Germany did not retaliate.
began to be harassed at popular Front
supporting Republican Spain.

rallies

for

not materially

Cries of "BlLnn to action" interspersed

B1Lnn's speech in Luna Park on September 6, the day news was
that Nationalist

BlLnn

troops destroyed

the Basque

town

received

of Irun on the

Spanish/French border.
In the winter of 1936-37, the British and French governments
officially prohibited "volunteers" fran going to Spain, but this also
proved ineffectual.

Rurrors circulated of German presence

in January 1937.

In Delbos' s

in Morocco

absence, Pierre Vienot convened the

chiefs of staff to prepare for a possible military respon$e.

Britain

and

the United States approved this firm stand and Hitler backed
down. 48 BlLnn was to remain "convinced" that "the risks of war were
real"

-

particularly referring to the Kamerun and January incidents

as well as to the later bombing of

the Deutschland and

the German

retaliation b¥ the bombing of a Republican town late in the Spring of
1937.

"If the risks of war were avoided," he

large measure

stated,

"it is

eo the lessening of international tension

due

in a
by

our

initiative of nonintervention.,,49
In the Spring of 1937 BlLnn called for "relaxed nonintervention":
"We voluntarily and systematically closed our eyes to

the contraband

of arms."SO Still, the French contraband was not nearly canparable in
volLnne to the German and Italian aid.
occurred.

Hitler

announced

On June 19 a

that Spain tried to

fourth

~rpedo

incident

the cruiser

Leipzig. In the middle of this crisis and exchange of accusations, the
BlLnn government fell.

The bnmediate reason for BlLnn's resignation lay

18
in his disagreement with the conservative Senate over
economic policy

to

counter the new fiscal crisis.

his

proposed

However, "It was

the international tension as much as anything else," Blum maintained,
that deterred him from an all-out fight with the Senate. 5l
The Radical Daladier-Bonnet leadership of the still lingering
Popular Front joined Britain in reaffirming

nonintervention.

Soon

after the Anschluss, the extension of German control over Austria, the
short-lived second Blum ministry of March 1938 began to advocate
mili tary aid to the Republicans, but it was too late.
then Madrid, in March 1939, fell.

Barcelona

and
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CHAPTER 2
/

Leon Blum

If one were to write the intellectual history of
our century ••• in the form of a biography of a
single person, aiming at no IOC>re
than a
metaphorical
approximation
to what
actually
happened in the minds of men, this person's mind
would stand revealed as having been forced to turn
full circle not once but twice, first when he
escaped from thought into action, or rather having
acted, - forced him back into thought.
- H. Arendt, Between Past and Future 1

"Have I changed
restless

in

three IOC>nths? , " Le6n Blum

crowd of French workers

the

that wondered about the Popular

Front's commitment to Spain's legitimate Republic.
could

implored

The day that

he

no longer reconcile his two duties as head of government and as

militant Socialist, he answered that day in Luna Park, September 1936,
was the day he could no longer in gcxx1 conscience
How did Blum

ideologically reconcile

international worker

solidarity,

with

the
his

remain

in power. 2

socialist imperative of
obligation as France's

democratically-elected leader to national security? Was Blum prepared
in his own mind to aid the Spanish government at the risk of internal

and external dissension and war?

In other
\

words,

were

there

20

ideological precedents

to Blum's justification for nonintervention?

If so, were they still relevant to 1936? Or if Blum did sacrifice his
Socialist principles, was it by choice or by reluctant

submission

to

outside opposition?
Appeasement,

an over-used, all-encompassing word, has never had

fewer than two connotations:

1), a peaceful settlement of legitimate

grievances through calculated but well-intentioned compromise or 2), a
slavish

abandonment of principles and interests in the face of terror

and threats. 3 If the France of 1936 could have

afforded

to

run

the

risks of war, confident that Hitler could be defeated, charges against
Blum's moral cowardice could be warranted.
if

the

If such were not the case,

conviction that France could not defeat Germany grew with the

approach of war, then Blum's efforts rrdght be seen in a more favorable
light.
chapter

It is to this latter possibility that
turn,

and

be

this

thesis

and

this

the relationship between Blum's principles and

heM they affected, or were affected by, the varying perceptions of the

fascist threat in Spain.
At first, Blum strongly supported selling the requested arms
the Spanish Republic.

But with mounting opposition in conservative

circles at home and in Britain, among pacifists on the Left,
the Popular

Front

and Mussolini.

To

be

and

in

cabinet, Blum resorted to negotiating with Hitler
the Left he

argued

that

if

the

legitimate

government were aided, the fascist rebels would get much more aid from
Germany and

Italy;

besides, France could not renege on an agreement

that Germany, Italy, Britain, and France, as well as the Soviet Union,
had signed to insure the peace of Europe. 4 At

the

same

time,

the
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center

and Right were pacified for the time being when he said the

initiative was French, that
France,

and

that

he

it prevented

himself was

skillfully justified (at least
Germany

isolated

and

divided

patriot. 5 In this light, Blum

a

until

an

1938,

when

the Anschluss

of

and Austria convinced Blum of Hitler's intentions) a very

controversial policy before a polarizing France.

He did so not out of

an evolutionist belief in "class collaboration," or "sacred union"

as

some on the Left have suggested,6 nor out of Kerensky-like weakness as
the Right had maintained,7

nor

out of

nai vete , as Col ton and others have accused.
chapter,

ideological blindness and
As we will

Blum was part of France's Scx:ialist

see

in

tradition,

this
which

considered itself the legitimate offspring of the French Revolution.
Socialism and Republicanism had always been compatible and correct to
Blum.

They were part of the faith

justice of

social democracy

and

~ of

revolutionary France

in

the moral

in

the

leadership of

a

politically liberated proletariat.
Internationalism and patriotism were also reconcilable to Blum.
The

development of

liberty,

equality,

and fraternity within each

nation \'K)uld both precede, and coexist wi th,
"That

a League of Nations.

international organization," he said in 1917, "will rest on an

ensemble of free nations, by free will, preserved in
and

integrity

in their development by general accord, by collective strength." 8

Peace, then,
National
nation.
free

their

was

security

not

the primary value over

rested

in

the

defense of liberties within one' s

A free nation \'K)uld lead to the eventual
nations.

Therefore,

national security.

internal

federation of all

dissension,

inextricably linked with international tensions.

to Blum,

was
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What did it mean for Blum to be a Socialist before 1934,

before

the Rassemblement Populaire? Blum's commitment to Socialism in France
actively began with his
Affair divided
Republicans
antisemites.
during

support of Alfred Dreyfus. The explosive

intellectuals

against

and

the militarists,

households;

monarchists,

A similar split of Left and Right was

the Spanish Civil War,

Republic.

polarized

it pitted

the Church, and
to mark

France

among other issues during the Third

Although Blum himself played a minor role in the Affair (as

a lawyer), he met
influence of

the

person who was

to

be

the m::>St

important

his political and ideological life: the great humanist,

Socialist leader, Jean Jaur~s. 9
In his Nouvelles Conversations de Goethe avec Eckermann

(1897),

Blum characterized Goethe's "second Faust" as a Socialist agitator, in
the manner of Jaure~:
I gave Faust eloquence, radiance, that magnetic
power that, in a crowd, everyone believes, and
despite oneself, in his force, sincerity and
goodness. I made him energetic and candid. He is
an optimist; he believes that man is just, that
only poverty and advanced civilization led him
astray and corrupted him.
To conquer, he only
appealfoto the most elevated sentiments of the
heart.
The

twenty-three-year-old Blum seemed

to

be

the Eighteenth

century man of reason and objectivity, looking up to the elite limen of
the race of Herder ."11 Born in a middle class background,
consciousness

was

though he grew

sparked more

up on

the

his

social

by the philosophes than by poverty,

bustling

and

strongly Republican ' rue

Saint-Denis in paris. 12 Yet his Socialist vision was essentially quite.
simple:

"true equality lies

in the exact connection between each

23

indi vidual and his abili ties , " regardless of weal th and social
order. 13 Blum linked democracy and Socialism all his life. He used
the same phrases in

/

~

l'echelle humaine over forty years later; in the

"democracy of tomorrav" all jobs are "equally noble,

since all

are

equally useful.,,14
Ironically the danger, the Achilles' heal, of Blum's Faust, was
a shrewd inventor who knew that
unemployment."

A new

"in our

society,

invention leads to workers ' riots, induced by

Mephistopheles, and the bourgeois parliament
Faust ' s

proposals.

"Goethe"

refuses

to

listen

to

Yet Faust accepts his lot and never trades his

noble suffering in the name of a
society. 15

science creates

believed

just and more

egalitarian future

that Faust would ultimately succeed.

Almost the same happened to Blum in power.
In Blum's (or "Goethe's") evaluation of the controversial leader
Bismarck, we again see the admiration of

the

"man of

Herder " maintaining personal integrity.

But this integrity is in the

context of Bismarck's pragmatism in a changing world,

the

race of

not vis-a-vis

Socialist principles.
He was a man free of prejudices and resentments,
who was never limi ted by dogmas, who always
penetrated
things with direct, impartial, and
practical vision, but who nevertheless remained
human.
He was a man of peace, having retarded war
for twenty years, and having reduced bloodshed to
the minimum.
He was rroderate in victory. The
evolution of his will was admirable in its constant
correspondence to the movement of life.
No one
surrendered more piously than this brutal rnasterl~f
history to reality and its necessities and laws.
Could

the

simultaneous

admiration for a Jaures and a Bismarck

shed light on Blum's behavior as a Premier

and Socialist

in 1936?

24
"Both Jaures

and Bismarck,

in Blum's estimation, retained a certain

core, a certain personal belief in humanity and peace ,
fact

despite

that one was principled and the other pragmatic.

To

this is to understand what confuses many historians:

the

understand

why Blum was

convinced that he could deal with Hitler and Mussolini by "challenging
their

honor(!)"

with the nonintervention pact.l 7 First, he certainly

had no illusions about Nazi Germany, but he did know its leader had to
be somehow accountable to his people.

Jaur~s

had written

There was never a democracy, however pacifist, that
could form if it did not guaranty national
independence.
There was never a nation, however
mdlitaristic, that could constitute or save itself
if it did not appeal in
measure to the
revolutionary forces of liberty.

sara

In the same way, Blum addressed the men of of the Vichy
accused

regime,

who

him of "dreams" 'of disarmament, that no people, "even in the

totalitarian regimes, would fight unless they were assured all
already

been

had

attempted to preserve peace." The advantage of rallying

the people was greater in a democracy, since the people had a stake in
the regime.
thus

for

In 1936, new military credits had passed
Blum,

"unanimously";

the French Republican and Socialist principle of a

"nation united" was the only legitimate way to combat

the Hitlerian

menace. 19
Secondly,

Blum had

faith

in" collecti ve secur i ty" as a moral

force of nations united against Germany through the arbitration of
League

of Nations.

His

remonstrations

against

a

the Hoare-Laval

agreement in December 1935 demonstrated that peace for him could not
be

guaranteed

any other

way;

justice among

nations should be as

25

justice among individuals.
Peace is only possible on a basis of equality of
rights and justice among nations, on the basis of
arbitration and mutual assistance, on the basis of
the magnificent concept that the ag~oessor against
one nation becomes the enemy of all.
And what if justice among nations did not,

in

reality,

laws of civil justice? Blum never fully explained.

reflect

the

In this sense he

shared in the moral despair and disillusionment of the interwar years.
Unfortunately, the morality and respect between enemies on paper
pre-World War

I Europe, as the film Le Grand Illusion despaired, was

no longer a widely held value

b¥ 1936.

Blum's belief in socialism as
religion, ,,21 comes

a moral

force,

"almost

from his Jewishness and from Jau;es.

as

Christians who hope in the next world, Jews are
with giving

"each his

Socialism?" He adds, "The Bible
,
Evangel1st

says:

due."
says:

"Is
a

Unlike

concerned with

that

not

Joan

this

the spirit of

just person -

when

the

,
,,22 To Jaures,
"
·
a SaInt.
SOCI, al'Ism was al so more
than

an economic doctrine, in the same way that the "patrie" was more
an

a

The Jewish

Messiah is Justice, Blum wrote in the Nouvelles Conversations.

world,

in

than

economic entity, as Marxists conceived it; it was God that guided
0f

'd
"
23 In t h e s ame way,
Arc, not econOIDlC
etermlnlsm.

Revolution of 1789 was more than the drive for property.
rioting in the faubourgs of Paris knew very well they were
fighting

for a piece of land.

French

The workers
not

each

What the Revolution gave them was "the

conscience of their dignity and
possibilities of

t he

their

strength,

and of

the

vast

action that would result, in a full democracy, from

their proud work. " They knew their

action,

continued Jaures,
"

would

have

an

effect for

26
the future, and they rejoiced in the present. 24

Blum likewise invoked the Revolution in his appeal to the young people
of France, To Be

~

Socialist.

of the full value of your

"Your salaries are never representative

work."

But during

the Revolution,

the

special privileges for the few had been abolished. 25
In

the

early years of the Third Republic when Jaur~s wrote and

when monarchism was still a strong political force, to be a republican
was a faith, more than it is today.
workers

a voice,

digni ty ,

as well

republicanism was

A Republic in France assured

the

a way to "conquer" power, to achieve liberty and
as

"economic

harmony. ,,26

for

Jaures,

the opposite side of the Socialist coin.

Jaur~s's

innovation was to humanize the "patrie",

Thus

which held

the

"roots of

human existence.,,27
In addition, Jaur~s gave Republican France a mission:
The only social role that France can fulfill in the
world, the only one that can give its actions
universal value and exalt the souls of the French
with a superior emotion, where the life of France
and the life of humanity vibrate, is to aid, in
France,
by all
the strength of re~aican
democracy, the advent of labor over property.
"Jaures
criticized the ambiguous phrase "the workers have no homeland. "

In France in the late Nineteenth -

early Twentieth Centuries,

the

working classes were kept outside the social order, were not part of
the definition of the "state."
serious

and

Therefore

to

was

bloody protest

in France against

this

the most
situation.

affirm that the proletariat had no homeland at that

to actually negate

the gains of

"paralyze" the working class
bourgeoisie.

The Corrmune of 1870 was

He quoted Marx:

am

the French

democracy,

am

time

revolution, to
to

protect the

27

Without doubt the proletariat must first conquer
political power, rise up as a national sovereign
class and constitute itelf as a nation; in this
sense it is still attached to a 2~tionali ty.
But
no longer in the bourgeois sense.
How does

the proletariat constitute itself as a nation, if the

proletariat does not even have

a voice within the

revolution was

Jaur~s

evolutionary,

concluded.

substi tute "the bourgeoisie had no homeland"
France before 1789.
immediately be

a

Therefore

comnunist one,

if

state?

Marx's

one could easily
the

subject were

the Revolution of Europe would not
but a

deTClC:Cratic and

bourgeois

revolution that would rid Europe of feudalism and pave the way for the
proletarian conquest of power. 30
Jaures
"

also saw no contradiction between proletarian socialists

and internationalists in the organization of national defense.
aoove all

"War

renders impossible regular social evolution. ,,31 But to rid

all military castes and financial circles from all nations,

enhancing

democracy within a country, is to serve not only the International and
the universal proletariat, but the patrie itself.
It is in the International that the independence of
nations finds its highest guarantee; it is in the
independent nations that the internat~2nal has its
most powerful and noble organization.
An

army,

then,

must emerge fran the people as a whole, "the nation

armed," rather than a military elite, whose corruption in France
Dreyfus Affair had uncovered.
study on The New

the

Jaur~s wrote a voluminous and detailed

~.

Central to this study of Blum's principles and whether

his

application of Jaur~s in the 1930s was anachronistic is the question:
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was there anything in Jaures ' s opinion
intervene

in

the

that would allow France

affairs of another

\.
J aures

state?

.

viewed

to
the

rapprochement in 1903 between France and England, along with France's
treaties

with

Russia

and Italy,

as

"liberating,"

leading

federations in the future. 33 However, alliances of two powers
t\~

others

threaten war.

to

against

For example, Jaur~, in a news article,

noted the potential danger of the conflicting allegiances of France
and England during

the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the first with

Russia, and the second with Japan.34 However it is difficult

to

find

any situation in Jaures's time comparable to the dilemma Blum faced of
whether

or

not

to support

the Spanish government.

between imperialisms of 1914 differed fram the

The conflict

unilateral

threat of

Nazism.
The

civil war

in Morocco was perhaps the closest parallel in

Jaures ' s time to the Spanish Civil War.
and

a

raid

In 1903, a revolt in Morocco

by Moroccan Berbers on French

troops patrolling the

Algerian frontier gave France the occasion for intervention.

Jaures,

who never requested independence for a single French colony,35 reacted
by

saying France

However,

he

had "interests of the highest order" in Morocco. 36

denOunced military intervention.

military expedition,

By

undertaking

France \o.Ould surrender her "role as mediator in

maintaining peace in the \o.Orld." He explained that since
nations

acted

as

a

a

bloc,

France's

the Moslem

"moral and economic action" in

Morocco would bias the neighboring nations in favor of France _ . what
he

called

"pacific penetration." The Moroccans would reciprocate the

friendly trade offers

b¥ extending French influence .
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In 1905, France sent an expedition against raids in Morooco.
while

later,

the visit of

between France and Germany.

the Kaiser to Tangier threatened a war

"Jaures
accused the Delcasse government of

having antagonized the German government, although he did
German militarism.

A

not excuse

France should negotiate a settlement with Germany

like that arranged with England.
Patriotism demands that diplomacy remove every
equivocation and pr3lJent, by frank explanation, all
possible conflicts.
He concluded

that opposition to intervention should be put forth by

both countr ies, and welccmed the other European fX)Wers
contribute

to

a

conference on

the

as well

to

"International Organization of

control. and guarantee.,,38
If such cooperation did not occur, Jaures nonetheless considered
France's security against an aggressive Germany most crucial.
fought

for

Jaures

peace, but he also preached a concrete form of patr iotism

based on the resolution to defend France against attack; to ensure her
security by means of a national rrdlitia and
restore

the

lost provinces;

the Triple Entente;

to

to further France's prestige in China,

Morocco, and the Near East. 39
Jaures was assassinated on the eve of World War I,
was

appealing

for peace and mediation when the crisis in the Balkans

erupted.

"What

he

been during

have

~uld

he have done had he been among us?

What

~uld

the war?," Blum asked in a lecture on July 31,

1917, the third anniversary of Jaures's death.
assurance:

just as he

He answered with
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About his attitude in the beginning, the days
following the assassination, there is no possible
doubt.
He hated war. All of his activities for
the preceding fifteen years had been directed
toward preventing it ••• He would thus have carried
out to the end the effort for peace. He would have
needed to be oampletely sure that, on our side,
everything that it was possible to do or to attempt
to prevent universal catastrophe had really been
done or attempted. Those who lived with him during
the last days know how imperious, how troubling was
this need of his conscience. But they also know
that the need had been. satisfied.
Confronted with certainty, with the irreparable, he
would not have doubted for a single instant that
war had been unleashed b¥ others, and that the
German government was indeed a criminal government
that had to be overthrown by war, fran the mcment
that it was not overthrown b¥ the revolutionary
struggle of the German proletariat... He would
He would have
have done what we have all done.
cooperated in the ~tional defense ••• and would have
becorne its leader.
Jaur~s

Whether

wo~d

have

decided

to participate in the war

effort or not, the Socialist Party in France
question

of

"class

was

divided on

collaboration" • For many socialists in 1914, as

for Blum, the hope for a lasting peace fell with the collapse of
German proletariat.
a

nation

under

bourgeois rule.
leaders

the

Most French Socialists responded as citizens of
attack.

Others

Still others

Alsace-Lorraine.

the

thought

clamored
the war

Blum served as ---chef de cabinet

in the ·g overnment.

"revanche"

for

would finally end

under

two

Socialist

The "sacred union" began to fall apart by

1916, when France was losing badly and when revolution was threatening
in tsarist Russia.

But Blum was convinced of

the

oampatibility of

patriotism and socialism. 4l
To Blum World War I demonstrated how fragile even so sizable a
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German Socialist Party was, if "it did not rest on political
on

a

liberty,

republican regime" like France. 42 Blum's militancy at this time

is striking; it was not the conciliarism of a

later

time,

Lacouture

argues. 43 Blum described his interpretation of Jaures further:
He
knew
that
in
today's
capitalist
regime ••• social revolution can never be conceived
in an isolated nation ••• and when other nations are
not won over
by propaganda...
The French
Revolution itself only succeeded because of the
democratic sympathy of peoples on which Jaures
insisted with
force
and novelty, and which
proceeded from the European fOC)vernent of ideas in
the Eighteenth Century.
Jaures would never have doubted that the war posed
a crisis of conscience before humanity -- the same
as Tolstoy noted in the Dreyfus Affair -- and that
if a crisis was resolved by a German victory, we
would only find wasted g~ beings with which to
build the future society.
We need the "sacred union, n said Blum;
alive,

only Jaur~s

were

still

he would have lifted the Party's morale , he would have "shown

us the true reasons...
for

if

war"

were

the just reasons for war . " The

to combat

"just

reasons

"industrial caesarisrn" in order to assure

Socialism for tomorrow.
Blum emerged from the war a strong advocate of party unity and
became

its leader, "the inventor of a elusive Socialist center.,,45 At

the time he wrote To Be

~

Socialist,

he

spoke

eloquently on

"vectorial sum" of Socialist ideas in flux.
The party is continually changing and evolving
between two options, two fixed poles: one is the
future society which we foresee, which we predict,
which we bring into being; the other is the present
soc~ety ~6omwhose womb we wish to draw that future
SOCIety.

the
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As the 1920s unfolded, the Socialist Party divided on
whether

to participate

reform through existing

in

the government,

institutions or

the

issue of

the old issue of labor

outright

revolution.

The

French Communist Party was formed in December 1920 at the Socialist
Congress of Tours,
Addressing

choosing

the Congress,

he

began,

the

the

Blum demonstrated

concept of the revolution in
Granted,

to follow

the

transition

direction of Moscow.
his

adherence

from Marx

error,

that

and

to

the

final

But

there

is

"consists in thinking that the conquest of

poli tical power is an end in itself, while it
means

Jaures.

reformists are wrong in assuming the social

transformation could arise without a political crisis.
another

to

to the

is

only a means, "

a

transformation of the economic system, against

bourgeois power. 47
By 1926, Blum further developed what Henry Kissinger would call
fifty years

later

famous distinction

a

"conceptual breakthrough" by establishing the

between

power. 48 Blum proposed

the

"conquest"

and

the

uexerciseu

of

a third solution to the Socialist dilemma of

participation in a bourgeois government.

Before the

revolution,

the

Socialist party should only enter government insofar as it would have
control over the situation.

Blum admitted that proceeding within the

legal parliamentary and democratic procedures "is and always will be a
particularly difficult and painful task for socialist parties" in that
the masses would be still nore impatient for bold action.
government
resolution,

under

socialist leadership would

act

However, a

"with

energy,

and decisiveness that would not (allow) it to be stopped

by the obstacles that other governments

find

insurmountable.,,49 The
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essence of

"Blumism, "

to Lacouture,

is summed up in the following

letter to Maurice Sarraut in 1926. Sarraut had accused
Party of having contributed

to

the Socialist

the downfall of the Cartel des gauches,

in refusing to participate in the government:
Because, in our eyes, revolutionary transfo~ation
presupposes a period of preparatory work, which
will have sufficiently penetrated, molded, and
adapted capitalist society, and will have insured
the adequate development of socialist realities and
socialist
ideas;
because we know that this
preparatory work is dependent domestically on the
protection and extension of political freedom and
externally on peace, we can support the Radical
program in these three areas: political freedom,
peace, and social reforms. We cannot support it as
useful and beneficial in itself; we can support it
only as contr ibuting to our a.mefforts. In this
sense, according to the now classic expression, we
and the Radicals can "go part of the way together."
If the Radical Party vigorously undertakes the
action that corresponds to its role, it will remain
possible to find a sufficient number of common
objectives for our concerted energies. For the
Radicals, this will be the end and the gogO; for
us, it will be the beginning and the means.
Therefore,

from 1921 to 1933, as party leader and deputy in the

Chamber, Blum developed his a.m doctr ine of Socialism

."
Jaures's

a::mbining

ideal of patriotism with

in government,

the

revolutionary

transformation of society that did not happen after the War.

Although

Blum was insulted and attacked fram all sides he nevertheless strongly
voiced a consistent stance on many domestic and foreign policy issues.
He courageously protested the chauvinism on both sides of
while the occupation of the Ruhr was taking place.
Hamburg

Socialist

Congress in 1923,

governments,

as

In a speech at the·

Blum received

awlause" for his boldness in attacking both

"thunderous

the French and German

well as for his Jaur~ian remarks.

patriotism and internationalism was defined as

the Rhine

The coupling of
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the conviction, which is continually confirmed by
experience, that in the current state of the world
economy there can be no contradiction between the
real, long-range interests of one pacific nation
and theSlreal, long-range interests of' all the
others.
Greatly moved,

the

president of the session, a former supporter of

"sacred union" on the German side, praised Bhnn's courageous speech, a
reminder

of

,-

"Jaures ••• filled

with

the

purest

spirit

of

internationalisrn."S2
Hitler's oomdng to power in 1933 and the rise of fascist parties
in Europe along with economic crisis were key turning points in the

..

future direction of the Socialist platform in France.

Jaures wrote in

a time when democracy was on the rise in Europe, and organized labor
was beginning to be heard, as well as when nationalist movements began
to

grON more influential.

capi talist war.
states

The Second International of 1905 condemned

But after 1918,

rose while

the

trend was

the democracies faltered.

came the realization that the war did not
Europe's

lead

reversed.

Fascist

After the sacred union
to

the downfall of

bourgeoisie but in fact created a class of nouveaux riches.

Socialists on the right like Renaudel began to advocate

joining

the newly re-formed Radical government and "defend democracy" rather
than oppose the capitalist regime.

Blum agreed that "national defense

is conceivable in a capitalist regime." But he added right away

that

lito go back on our traditional or:position to military budgets would
deal a ser ious blON to peace."
Europe

to

dangerous

Such

deductions

and

a

sudden

reversal would

lead

would foster the "psychosis of

war .IIS3 At close examination, Blum was not contradicting his

aNn

past
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support of the "sacred union." His opposition to military budgets carne
at

a

time when

he protested the unrealistic French expectations of

reparations from Germany, and when disarmament talks were in progress.
Other socialists to the right,
Blum,

disdainfully

called

"neos"

by

Paul Faure and the other party leaders, correctly diagnosed the

mystique of fascism to the lower middle classes, but their cure was by
innoculation of
Nation,"

the

disease.

They cr ied

for

"Order,

Author i ty ,

not social democracy. 54, Meanwhile the Center and Left of the

Party reinforced its hard line against participation and
HeM .. did

the

threat of

a rival ideology of the right, in the

French Socialist debate, affect Blum's perspective on
socialist

the

nature of

"exercise of power," if at all? Up until now, we have seen

him comfortably

uniting, patiotism with

internationalism.

France

social

revolution

and

had a positive "mission" to change its own

economic and social structure
nations.

rearmament.

But did Blum have

and

to

"arbi trate"

among

the other

to change his ideas after Hitler? Of

crucial importance, was there anything in Blum's thought between 1933
and

1936

that

would presage his reaction to Spain when he and the

Popular Front took power?

In other words, is it legitimate

to

argue

that Blum's ideology was too unrealistic and the man too unequipped to
deal with a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Franco, to maintain peace?
so, why?

If

Or must we look elsewhere to the context of the time, of the

cultural and social, political and economic trends of the

1930s,

for

the key to Blum's behavior?
According

to historian Marcus, French socialists replaced their

"messianic zeal" for a better, classless society, with

a

destructive
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to

the Party -

anti-fascist mystique,

a

sort of" fai th by

negation." "It produced," he wrote, "a fatal indecision over what

the

Socialist could do to meet it. ,,55
I

would

argue

that Blum was one of the notable exceptions who

recognized that the appeal of fascism was

above

traditional Marxist

economic explanations for any phenomenon.

He was less naive than the

standard historical interpretation of him.

Yet though I

with Lacouture and Droz

that Blum was often unable to draw the

conclusions his perceptivity would imply, the
ignores

would agree

accusation of naivete

the very limited extent to which Blum was to "exercise power"

in the coalition.

The interplay of the Socialist factions during this

time also limited his alternatives.
For example, Blum's . views on disarmament were central to Blum's
strategy between 1930 and

1935.

Yet he did rearm France when he

became Premier.

Why?

threatened,

that collective security was the only solution and

and

Because he

"collective securitu only rests on the

saw

that Europe was

force

in fact

of arms. ,,56 But Blum

never gave up the hope for disarmament, and even held discussions with
a

representative of Hitler in 1936 to discuss the possibility of arms

control.

His account of this meeting, before the judges at Riom,

one the most moving of his career:
I could have told (Dr. Schacht) , if I was the man
you depict: "I am a Marxist, I am a Jew, I do not
enter into talks with a State which has extirpated
all the SOCialist organizations and where Jews are
persecuted." If I had said that, I would have
betrayed the charges of my office. But I told him:
"I am a Marxist, I am a Je!Ii, and it is because of
this that I truly desire to follow through our
conversation." He answered me: Monsieur, that gives
you all the greater honor." I did not ask that

is
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compliment of him, but I took advantage of it to
show him that when dealing with questions of
disarmament,
whether
in Geneva, or Paris or
elsewhere, I did so with the interests of the
country in mind. At the same time, I rearmed as no
other person had done. In one case after another,
I fulfilled the duties of my charge, my duty as
head of ~9vernment.
I fulfilled my duty as a
Frenchman.
/

This shows of what Leon Blum was made.
French

nationalist.

He

suffered like

He achieved honor

admired

fran his youth, Bismarck.

the necessity of rearmament until 1936
Lacouture writes,

for

that other

If Blum did not see

"he cannot be faulted,"

having denounced

as

the chauvinism of Generals

Weygand and p~tain who "enclosed the French army in the most
atdication of

a

his Faust, was principled,

humanitarian, and hopeful like Jaures, and pragmatic like
statesman he

as

routine

intelligence." Also, a man whose strategic realism and

authority are more

acknowledged

than

those of

Blum,

Franklin

Roosevelt, revived disarmament negotiations with MacDonald and Herriot
as

late

as 1937.

And

a man who left the SFIO in 1931 to be better

able to devote himself to the national

defense,

Paul-Boncour,

still

made disarmament part of his "constructive plan" of 1932. 58
In Spain,

Blum could have

intervention or nonintervention.

intellectually justified either

He could have justified intervention

in the Jaur~sian messianic sense -- in fact Blum preferred
"interference"

at

the

time.

dictators would honor their

Colton says Blum's

signatures

revealed

the word

faith that "the

one of his major

weaknesses. ,,59 But is there ever a time when a hurnani tar ian is out of
place in government?

Yes,

but only when the

confront others not as moral as him or herself.

humanitarian must

It was not his ideas,

or

his personality that deserve the verdict of "guilty" in not aiding

the Spanish Republic.

Blum was part of

democratic society.

In

the

a

time

and place,

in a

following chapters we will examine the

dynamic forces of France at the time of the Spanish appeal.
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0IAPl'ER 3

French Public Opinion
I was not a king in France. It was bnpossible for
me
to
envisage war without the consent of
Parliament and without the consent of public
opinion.

Some historians

and contemporaries of

the tumultuous 1930s,

including Blum himself, have maintained that had France intervened
Spain,

Civil War would have exploded in France herself.

fact true?

If not, what led Blum to believe it was?

in a particular
foreign affairs?

social class affect

in

Was this in

Did membership

involvement and interest in

In other words, were same sections of public opinion

more powerful than others?
France during

the

1930s was

suffering

from a

"crise

de

valeurs. ,,2 The French realized that it would be bnpossible to return
to the Belle Epoque of pre-war days.

The economic crisis

served

to

contradict the maxbn that a better standard of living comes from hard
work. 3 As a result of the First World War,
nation,

and

France

became a debtor

inflation and high prices marked the twenties.

there was no international system to regulate

floating debts,

Since
the

currency values of France, Britain, and the u.S. were disproportional,
leading

to -- at least for the French -- unsynchronized devaluations.

In 1928, the Poincare government stabilized the franc, to 1914 levels,
but it was too high with respect to the dollar and

pound,

and since
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French goods became expensive, unemployment rose (albeit not as badly
as in the Anglo powers).
In addition
fell--with

France was in a depression by 1933.

from 1924

to 1934,

several French governments

the same men oondng to power every time--while the fascist

regimes in Germany and Italy appeared stable.

The

peace established

by the Treaty of Versailles seemed woefully fragile.

And the French

still suffered psychologically from the war and the loss of its youth.
The low morale finally
February 1934

exploded

the

riots of

the

6 of

in Paris, where Rightists, groups of war veterans, and

some Cbrnmunists violently protested
government.

in

Marc Rucart,

against

the Radical Socialist

in his report on those protests in Paris ,

well summed up the prevailing pessimism of the day:
How can one believe in truth, beauty, goodness,
under the regime of lies and hate, under this
spectacle of hideous bloodshed? How can one truly
believe !n "imminent
justice" when iniquity
dominates?
But who were these weary people? What, secondly, did the

advent

of the Popular Front mean to them? What action did each group propose
for

France

in Spain, and how far did each group go -- or could have

gone -- to support. it?
We will start with the "petty bourgeoisie, " considered the
of French society.

These were primarily small shopkeepers, artisans,

white-collar workers, provincial lawyers, and teachers. 5 The
reconstruction

base

created

interwar

Large and

some nouveaux ' riches.

enterprises benefitted from foreign capital and inflation

small

in France.

The petty bourgeoisie was the one group that was not severely hurt by
the Depression, since it did not borrow or invest on
scale as big business.
affected

as

the

same

large

But it was only a matter of time before it was

production

fell

and

unemployment

rose.

Even civil
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servants were hurt
of

the

government solutions to tax them.

~

"One

result

prolonged Depression," writes the historian Nathanael Greene

"was the radicalization of

~rkers

and peasants, and the hostility of

small businessmen, hit hard by the Depression, to their demands.,,6
The SFIO was

composed prilnarily of workers, same peasants and
~rkers

artisans, intellectuals, white collar
small-town
areas.

civil

servants,

teachers and lawyers. 7 Its members tended to be from urban

However, it was the party of the rural petty bourgeoisie

the middle-of-the-road

liberals,

and

the Radical Party, that both the

Communist and the Socialist Parties knew
rndddle

and

they had

to capture.

The

classes traditionally believed the government must protect and

defend their established interests rather

than promote

innovation. a

This made them key targets of the fascist parties.
FranfDis

Goguel points out the correlation between the level of

industrialization
affiliation.

am

in particular

There

of

However,

sectors,

as

he

writes,

northwest France,

Mayenne and Morbihan departments usually did
agricultural

areas

France

party

and

is no direct correlation of peasant/conservative

worker/radical.

agricultural

regions

while

•such

heavily

or the Vendee, Mandre,
vote Right,

in other

,A

I

such as Creuse, Correze, Drome, and the Eastern

Pyrenees (the center to southeast France), the vote was Extreme Left. 9
And among industrial regions,
France,

the Paris

region

and northern

heavily industrial, voted Left, but other heavily industrial

sectors voted Right, such as the Somme and Oise in the northeast,
t he

'
t
unportan

nlf'
.nuone

and

La'lre

and

,
10 Cer t"aln
'
reglons.
po1"1 tlca1

proclivities seem to cut across regional lines.

catholic France,

example, voted traditionally to the Right despite social class. ll

for
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How does one explain the true "class character" of France, where
the

teachers were more

revolutionary than the "proletarian" metal

workers' union?12 Goguel's electoral geography could still provide
explanation.

He differentiated between "static" and "dynamic" France.

In static France,
average

and

an

its

increases in productivity were below the national
economic structure and

tradtional liberalism of

ideologies

the Nineteenth Century.

retained

the

In these regions,

"Socialism meant primarily a political concept, a modern-dress version
of republican principles and an expression of sinistrisme.,,13

In

dynamic France, where industrial production was above average, such as
in

the

northeast and Paris,

scx:::ial mobility was greater and this

instability, especially during the Depression, may have contributed to
the radicalization of the workers. 14 The demands of the First WOrld
War

altered

the

economic geography of the country, with a continual
influx of workers to the new industrial centers from rural areas. IS
All of this implies that static France

with

supported an alliance

the political party which traditionally glorified individualism,

smallness and the family firm, while the federations of dynamic France
demanded a strict class alignment against middle-class civilization
"and its natural, if monstrous, offspring, fascism. ,,16
Blum once asked himself

how

the

riots of February 6, 1934

against the French Republic "could have failed; logically they should
have succeeded. ,,17 The Left succeeded, partly due to the rhetoric of a
united

"defensive"

front

against

fascism,

and

to

the Conmunist

turn-around and overture to the Socialists on the one hand, and to the
petty bourgeoisie on the other.
those

regions

The extreme left began

steadfastly republican as well

Depression had politically radicalized both

to

capture

as "dynamic".18 The

the workers

and

the
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peasantry.

Masses of French workers went on strike on February 12,

1934 with one million in Paris alone. 19 Another reason for the failure
of the February 6 riots lay in the stability of France's democratic
tradition.

French conservatives -- at least until 1940 -- maintained

their allegiance to the Republic.
adds,

"France

Unlike Italy and Germany,

Greene

had built-in safeguards against fascism in her tightly

structured society, the traditions of the

family

individualism,

and

and the bourgeois beliefs that buttressed the "stalemated" society.,,20
The

alliance of the middle classes and the workers brought the

Popular Front to power,

but

the Spanish Civil War

,21 Trad'It 1'anally,
agaIn.

France had

danestic than foreign politics.
government,

divided

them

been much more concerned with

"While Parliament could embarrass

a

either in conmittee or in open session, very, very rarely

was it prepared to seize on a

foreign

issue

for

the purpose of

toppling a rninistry.,,22 The order of interest in politics had been, in
declining

order

of

importance,

finally international.

This

municipal,

attitude

regional, national, and

explains why

percent of all parliamentary questions

were

role

in

the Councilor

than one

addressed to foreign

affairs, or why there was never a single debate
France's

less

on

the question of

the Assembly of

the League of

Nations. 23
But "it would be
summer

00

exaggeration" to say that by the end of

in 1936, foreign affairs became the citizen's main concern. 24

The French workers were naturally the most

solid

Spanish government and L~n Jouhaux, head of the
labor

the

leaders

International

to
Law"

urge

"all democratic

supporters of

ror,

states,

the

was one of many
conforming

to

to supply the legal Spanish government "the means

necessary for her defense." 25 Each

late July

and August day,

Le
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Populaire listed unions supporting Spain.
Populaire,

Le

Peuple

(of

the <Dr)

Left-wing papers such as Le

and

nonintervention proposal.

In Saint-Clooo

pro!X>Sal

Blum was

was

announced,

L'Humanitt denounced the
on August

greeted

8,

after

the

with cries of "Guns and

planes for Spain!,,26
On September 5, Blum received a delegation of metal workers who,
claiming to support Spain, warned him that they were preparing to call
a one-hour strike two days later, to pressure the government to change
its policy to more effective aid

for

Spain.

Blum dismissed

them,

seemingly out of character for him, answering that a strike would not
change the policy adopted in

the

nervous. 27 He

Seine Socialist Federation was to call a

learned

the

general

meeting on aid to Spain iI,1 Luna-Park and,
decided

to

attend.

authority

although

Yet Blum

not

invited,

was

he

That day also ooincided with the fall of Irun to
Blum's clear speech and

Franoo, further exciting public opinion.
of

interest.

transformed

the

cries

"Blum to action!" to "Vive

of

Blum! ,,28 "I understand you," he said, but he added France cannot
not

risk

international

war,

other powers.

Few in the crowd oontinued to question Blum's sincerity

and

oould

air

renege on an agreement signed by

and Jrotivations for his policy.29
The Right, however, was
attacks

on

the

Popular

much

Front

Jrore

vocal

sympathy with

identified the Right with the "bourgeoisie":
servants,

certain

newspapers,

and

united

Spain.

to

be

the true

ll

local assemblies,

civil

finance, and above all, the Senate. 30
proclaimed

nationalists," their hatred of carmunism

and fear of revolution, led them to take sides with the

states. 31 They

its

Blum himself

The curious paradox of the Right is that while its members
themselves

in

authoritarian

had genuinely feared the strikes that had intensified
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with the advent of the Popular Front.

Intellectuals on

Right,

the

such as Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and Pierre Gaxotte, discussed the
danger

of a Bolshevized Spain.

intervention

in

supporters.

latter

panicked:

"French

the Spanish Civil War would be the beginning of the

European conflagration wanted by
harshest measures

The

Mos<XM. ,,32

Those who

advocated

the

against Germany after World War I now became her

"Better Hi tIer than Blum" was one slogan of the .day.

But the point is to ask:

Why did Blum listen

to

the Right,

which was in the minority in the French Government in 1936?
For

one, the rightist press was in fact an actor in the affair .

It was through the Echo de Paris that, as early as July 22, the
of

the Spanish goverrunent's

news

telegram was revealed, as well as, and

rrore importantly, how many arms

and planes were

sent. 33 Henri

de

K~rillis of L'Echo was the first to tell Blum, when Blum was in
England on the 24th, that the sale of arms was "not well

seen"

back

home. 34 A confidential memo on July 25 from France's ambassador in
Berlin revealed that Germany paid close attention to articles
.-/

Liberte,

the Echo de Par is,

Le Jour,

"etc. "

in

the

These articles had

"insinuated the Quai d'Orsay was in disagreement" with Blum. 35 Could
these papers

have tried to provoke dissension within the cabinet, or

at least to exploit the differences?
Blum's son, Robert, who was
entire

close

to

his

father

during

the

affair, maintained that Blum was firmly resolved to aid Spain.

Yet he knew he would have to proceed in secret, so as not
the Rassernblernent Populaire.

rupture

But once the center and rightist papers

publicized the issue, "certain Radical leaders
(the papers') opinion. ,,36

to

let Blum

know

their
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Protest

in

the

rightist press was the bnmediate cause of the

cabinet's reconsideration of selling arms to Spain on July 25.

The

Action Francaise led an active campaign to mobilize national opinion.

J

Charivari, who closely collaborated with L'Action, reported:
It must be said because it is the truth: a French
newspaperman has this week rendered a signal
service to his country: Maurice Pujo. It was Pujo
who first, with proofs and detail in support,
denounced the odious deal ••• It was Pujo who first
put a stop to execution of the bargain, who
provoked the intervention of M. Henri Berenger (a
Senator)...
and the pecial cabinet announcement
of Saturday afternoon. 37
Delbos himself indirectly corroborated
rightist press

and

the

the cabinet's decision.

connection between the
He informed all French

Ambassadors that rep::>rts of France "lending its support to the Spanish
government to canbat the insurgents" were inaccurate.

Delivery of war

materiel to Spain (not unarmed planes) was forbidden, and reminded the
Ambassadors that France did not intervene

in the

affairs of other

nations. 38
Another

undercurrent

Spanish Civil War,
element

was

of division

in Blum's struggle with the right on the

anti-semitism.

Anti-semitism,

a principle

in France since the Dreyfus Affair, was revived

wi th the influx of refugees

in France fran Central Europe.39 On

February

6, 1934 cries of "France for the French" rang out along with
anti-oommunist slogans. 40 Many journalists did not hesitate to
associate Franco with the Church against Bolshevism. 41 Not only did
Blum have to defend his patriotism as a socialist, but also as a Jew.
Between

the Left agitating against

concessions

to the fascists,

domestic and international, and the Right, accusing the "unassimilable
Jew" of warmongering, Blum asserted in Luna Park:
I am a Frenchman -:- since I am French prom of
his country, proud of her history, nourished as

47
much as possible, despite my race, on her tradition
(Applause) ••• I will neglect nothing to assure the
security of her defense ••• But, when we speak of
national dignity ••• one of the necessary elements of
nati~nal 4~nor
is the will for peace (prolonged
ovation).
(Of the

II

since I am French, II Henr i B~r and

in the

fascist newspaper

Gringoire wrote sarcastically, lilt is too beautiful, too beautifuL ••
Neither Sully, nor Richelieu, nor Danton, nor Carnot, nor Clemenceau,
nor Poincare, judged it necessary to produce their birth certificates.
No one asked them where they came from, granted II ) • 43
The Right took advantage of the Spanish Civil War to exploit its
ongoing opposition to

the Popular Front experiment. It accused the
government of provoking war at home and abroad. 44 Self-defense groups
formed

that July, including the "cagoulards", a domestic spy network.

(Their false accusations in November

1936 of

the Minister of the

Interior of desertion during World War I led to his suicide).
on the Left were more divided and confused.
perceptively noted

in Le populaire,

As

Those

Oreste Rosenfeld

August 10, 1936, on the Left

riots, "Peace ••• and planes! That combination is tragic...

But who

is

at fault?"45
Public opinion "quickly and fiercely mobilized" in France for
each of the camps fighting in spain;46 the Left remembered 1934 and
feared

new fascist

riots while

the Right feared the "red peril".

Blum's fear that the threat of civil war was not totally illusory.47
In a letter to the sister of a colleague, he later wrote:
If
these
possibilities
had became real
(intervention and its consequences), civil· war in
France would have preceded international war. The
Spanish affair took place between the 6th of
February and the armistice.
It was intertwined
with the social crisis. As soon as the situation
had become dangerously tense, we would have had the
equivalent of Franco's coup in France. Before any
foreign war, France would have had civil war with

48
little chance of victory for the Republic. That
is, Spain would have been delivered.
But Fran~
would have beoame Fascist, probably before Spain.
Although

his analysis is perhaps over-dramatic, French history

does present many examples of the danger in certain patterns of plass
alliances:
In the Year II , the foreign danger united bourgeois
and
sans-culotte because that danger was of
aristocratic counter-revolution; in 1870,
the
French ruling classes did not have as serious a
motive to resist Bismarck, and the patriotic and
disinterested spirit of the popular masses in the
ci ties did not find mor~9 than a mediocre echo in
the French bourgeoisie.
In his A l'Echelle Hurnaine, the culmination of his life's work,
written in 1941 while lrnprisoned and awaiting

trial by the Vichy

regime, Leon Blum criticized the pcMer of the French bourgeoisie.
fact,

each time the will ' of the country manifests itself

~

"In

universal

suffrage, •• • the ruling bourgeoisie never lost a moment to eliminate it
and reject it as a foreign body. "SO He may have had his
on Spain

in rrdnd,

as well as other

frustrations

examples in French history,

including Vichy.
Yet

to which French social group did Blum

responsible

for

once

he

see

himself

took office? Was Blum, when he exercised

power in the name of the left coalition, supposed to govern the rrdddle
cl asses of France, the workers of the world, or the French?

One of

the ironies of democracy and "public opinion" is that "the good of the
whole"

requires

the leader to make choices.

Blum chose, in the case

of Spain, not to appear to be embroiling France in a partisan conflict
for partisan reasons; he chose nonintervention.
upon

the

George Orwell hit

humanitarian'S dilemma, a humanitarian who, when in pcMer,

chooses for the whole to live, rather than to risk civil war:
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If the Spanish Civil War had been won, the cause of
the common people everywhere would have
been
strengthened...
that wa~lthe real issue; all else
was froth on its surface.
Given Blum's beliefs
defense of

that France ' s

best

interests

required

the Republic, internal stability, and social reforms, and

given the explosive nature of the Spanish Civil War
French people,

issue

for

the

the Socialist Premier's commitment to nonintervention
becomes clearer if not inevitable. 52
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The Political Parties of the Popular Front Coalition

Roughly,

scholars divide

into

t\<,O camps when examining the

origins of the French policy of nonintervention.

The first

(mostly

British historians) emphasizes domestic politics, that Blum and Delbos
found

themselves

llinited

by a divided cabinet and country.l To the

other school, which includes more left-wing historians and apologists,
the British opposition to intervention was the decisive factor. 2 This
chapter will concentrate on the first interpretation, best summarized
by Young:
To have pressed on with the

original decision to
aid the beleaguered Spanish government \<'ould have
meant the strait-jacketing if not the fall of his
administration.
The Senate, without doubt, \<'ould
have mounted a relentless opposition; and the
wavering of many deputies, especially within the
ranks of the Radical Socialists,
\<'ould have
imperiled the ~overnment even inside the newly
elected Chamber.
How bnportant were the internal pressures of Blum's cabinet and
coalition politics? What were these pressures? Why did Blum listen?
Could parliament effectively threaten the new social reforms?

Could
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it have caused

the

collapse of

the Popular Front? What type of

"uni ty" was important to Blun and why?
The nature of the bond between the Socialists, Radicals, and the
Conmunists was tenuous at best fran the time

"unity of

declared after

Because each party had a

the February 6, 1934 riots.

particular interest in forming the coalition, because
was

dOminated

by

action"

was

the parliament

the more moderate Radical Party and

intervention in the Spanish Civil War was a divisive

issue

because
for

the

Socialist Party itself, Blun exercised power within limits.
The

Communist

Party

initiated

the Popular Front. 4 The

Communists, ever since the schism at Tours in 1920,
refused

to

associate with the bourgeois socialists, even on February

6, 1934, and remained a small party.
of the population voted Corrmunist.
its

had consistently

rhetoric

to

antifascism,

In the 1932 election , only 6. 78 %
But by 1936, the party had changed

and

doubled

its

constituency,

particularly among workers who were disenchanted with the Socialist
Party's
Suddenly,

former
it

dealings with the Radical Party
seemed,

the Communists went

in the

1920s. 5

from a position of

revolutionary defeatism, a stance against national defense under
circumstances,

to

patriotism. 6

According

to

the

party,

any
the

international proletariat now demanded the defeat of Germany.7
Why did the Communists change course? Firstly,
attuned

the party was

to Moscow which feared the rearmament of fascist Germany; the

threat to the USSR was more llnportant than class conflict.

Secondly,

some historians conjecture that Stalin wanted to prevent an alliance
of Britain, France and Germany against an isolated USSR.

The French
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Communists

could work

against

this

possibility

thirdly, as many in the 1930s suspected, in the
France

from within.

event of

a

And

war

of

and Great Britain against Germany, Stalin could come in and

take over Europe.8
The Franco-Soviet nonaggression treaty of May 1933,

and

the

mutual assistance pact signed on May 3, 1935 by Foreign Minister Laval
and

Soviet Ambassador

Potemkin explained

the Communist Party's

reversal on the French rearmament effort. 9 The Pact read:
Stalin understands and fully approves the policy of
national defense pursued by France in order to
maintain its
forces at a level consistent
with its security.

armra

Some Socialists like Marx Dormoy, and Blum to some extent ,

were

skeptical of a unity "desired by Moscow. "II However, Blum wrote in Le
Populaire on July 14, 1934, a day before the -"unity of
announced,

"I

knew what

the word

"unity"

meant

action"

for

was

Jaures.

A

persistent and prudent will to maintain and tighten the unity of our
Party,

a

persistent and bold will to direct the Party towards worker

unity, that is how, in the)light of his memory,
duty.,,12

The

appears

two labor parties, the socialist

ror

to

me our

and the Communist

CGTU reunited in March 1936.
However, in 1934 the Communist Party had
than

less

of

an

interest

the Socialist Party in structural reform of the economy since it

wanted to gain the
powerful

bourgeois

~rtant

backing of

constituency

the Radical Party and

the

it represented in the fight against

fascism. 13 The Rassemblement Populaire program of January 11, 1936 was
broad enough to attract all of France's Left.

Although addressing
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financial

and

fascist threat:

social reforms, it was a defensive program against the
to

dissolve

the paramilitary fascist

leagues;

to

maintain

international peace; to maintain democratic liberties; to
investigate France's colonies. 14 Not until after the May 1936 election

was it decided that the Socialist Party, and Leon Blum, would head the
coaltion.
The Communist Party did not participate
cabinet,

and

the

~lications

were crucial

action, including the issue of Spain.
cabinet was more
been.

to

in

the Popular Front
to Blum's freedom of

It meant the balance in Blum's

the Radical right than it otherwise might have

The Communist Party, according to its leader,

Maurice Thorez,

declined Blum's offer, because it was "convinced that the Comnunists
will better serve the cause of the people
unreservedly

and without interruption, the government under Socialist

leadership, rather than by offering, through
cabinet,

by loyally supporting,

their presence

in

the

a pretext for the enemies of the people to create panic. ,,15

One French journalist in Moscow reported conversations he had had with
Soviet civilian and military leaders on
His

informants expected

respond

"a strong

afPropriately to Hitler."

the Popular Front victory.

and united France determined to

For

this

reason,

the Soviets

declared themselves in favor of a postponement of revolution.

The aim

was a strong and stable France able to follow through on her pact with
the Soviet Union. 16
The nonintervention policy sharply divided
coalition.
Thorez ,

for

the

antifascist

Despite the USSR's favorable reception to the agreement,
the Ccmnunists, demanded France send aid to the Spanish
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workers. 17 The Soviet government feared a France

isolated on

three

sides from her Eastern European allies, and when it saw to what extent
Germany and

Italy were violationg nonintervention, she began to send

planes in October.
consider

itself

The Soviet government announced
bound

by

the

greater extent than any of the
later

"it could

not

agreement for nonintervention to any
remaining participants. II

Two months

the French Communists abstained for the first time, from voting

on a motion of confidence related to the French government's
policy.

foreign

However,

the party still pledged its support to the Popular
Front's other policies. 18
The Communist presence in the coalition was crucial

insofar

as

it frightened the more conservative and propertied classes in France.
Blum's second ministry fell within a month

in March 1938,
because he proposed to include Communists in his cabinet. 19
The

Communist presence was

although the unions tried to steer

~rtant

clear

predominantly Socialist and Communist.
withheld its vote of confidence for
Spain,

in splitting labor;

from politics,
After

partly

they were

the Communist Party

the Popular Front's policy on

Blum and his colleagues considered resigning.

But the Popular

Front, Blum wrote:
unanimously resolved to stay in pcMer. We decided
that an open cr 1SlS in such conditions and at such
a serious mcment would bind neither France nor
other nations, that it would throw public opinion
into trouble and confusion, that it would risk
weakening the country and putting social reforms
just passed into question. (He then reminded the
Oammunist section of Parliament that) it is not
only surmounting the difficulty of the hour, but of
resolving it so that tomorrow, ~oaction can be
pursued with confidence and loyalty.
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But historian Annie Kriegel
abandonment of

his

socialism.

is

soviets.

a

analogous

unique prole tar ian party,

proposed. 2l Nevertheless,

as Thorez

nonparticipation

from below,

to

the

Blum and the SFIO dismissed the idea and passed up

the oPfXJrtuni ty to create
Front",

seeming

In 1935, the French Communists had

envisioned Popular Front comni ttees
Russian

critical of Blum's

in

the

government,

even

a

"French

the Communist Party's
though

the

Party

proportionately received the greatest electoral gains in May 1936, and
its oscillation between sUPfXJrt and admonition for the Popular Front,
do not exonerate

it.

As

Lacouture writes,' "the

absence

of

the

Communists constantly unbalanced the team and made the Radicals Blum's
critics if not his jailers.,,22
Blum's

relations

with

the

Radical Party were

no less

troublesome, and perhaps even more so, since his Minister of National
Defense (Daladier) and his Minister of Foreign Affairs(Delbos), as well
as

the

Vice

of

the

were

all

the highest posts in making foreign policy.

The

Navy (Gasnier-Duparc) and
Radicals

and

held

the Minister

Radicals accepted the invitations of
less out of

and

(Chautemps)

Premier

ideology

the Minister

of Aviation(Cot),

the Socialists

and Communists

than out of, as Greene surrmarizes, "electoral

advantage, the opportunity to govern, the defense of the Republic, and
the prospect of a number of reforms.,,23
Most were not enthusiastic about the

alliance,

but

they were

well aware of the significance of their electoral weight, whether they
swung to the Left or to the Right.
Edouard

Herriot

and was

Daladier took over the Party after

affectionately

known as

the

"bull of
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Vaucluse,1I although he did not prove to be steadfast on February 6,
1934,

when

he

resigned

less

carmunist demonstrations.
Cot

and Jean

Zay

than a

day

after

But a new generation of

the rightist and
IIYoung Radicals,"

(later Blum's minister of Education), emerged who

II refused to condemn roth fascism and carmunism as equal threats."

The

Radicals, as in the past, were torn between their leftist impulses and
their pocketbooks. 24
One might

ask,

gi ven

the decision of the Cornnunists not to

participate in the cabinet, should Blum have proposed, for the sake of
balance, that the Radicals likewise decline?
a

purely Socialist government,

Communists would not have
anyway?

This was

Chautemps
"beyond

represented

actua~ly

after the elections.

given

proposed

Lacouture

b¥

Should Blum have

that

a

a

true

formed

cabinet without the
tripartite coalition

two left socialists a few days

indicates,

however,

that

to

keep

and Herriot, Daladier and Sarraut out of the government was
hLm\all

IIAlthough Blum

strength"
the

and politically

logician must

have

unworkable.
considered

He
it,

adds,

Blum the

practical politician inmediately rejected the possibility. ,,25
As

a result, the Radical Party entered the

coalition conscious

that despite the greater electoral gains of the parties farther left,
it held the upper hand.
Radical,

The powerful Senate itself was predominantly

albeit conservative.

Thus

erupted, Blum was forced, because of his
Party,

when

the

Spanish Civil War

dependence on the Radical

to downplay ideology in dealing with the foreign conflict.

we have seen, neither the President of the Senate, Jeanneney, nor

As
the

President of the Chamber , Herr iot, nor the President of the Republic,
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Lebrun,

wanted

Chautemps

to

risk

international war

likewise shared

over

spain. 26 Camille

the Parliament's worries.

He once took

aside same young Radicals, telling them the Spanish Government
fall

"like a

pack of cards. ,,27 While Blum was in London on July 24,

Daladier was barraged from the Chamber with questions
received

a

would

delegation

of Senators

from

on Spain.

He

the Right-wing Union

Rtpublicaine, led by their president, Leon B~rard, an interview which
Daladier

related

to Blum.

Berard

told a

journalist that

the

"unanimous opinion" of his group, "an opinion shared by practically
all

my colleagues

in the Senate, is that France's duty and interest

coincided to <::XJInpel her to maintain the strictest neutrality.,,28
But it was Delbos woo played the crucial,
role

in the formation

o~

" if

not decisi ve, "

French policy towards the Spanish Civil War.

He was sensitive to British interests and consistently relayed them to
Blum. 30
Yet

how

must the Radical Party be blamed? While all

the

noise

on Spain made headlines, Cot and Daladier continued to send shipments
of arms to Spain.

The French government pursued two policies.

Even

Delbos supported, at least until August 7, selling arms as long as the
fascist

governments did

also.

He

reversed Cot's policy when he

learned of the strong feelings in the Senate against delivering
materiel. 3l Many Radicals

especially did

not want French foreign

policy to awear ideologically directed. Herriot had told Blum,
grand,

don't get mixed

up

in

this

the

"Mon

affair, it would be extremely

dangerous, and you cannot do it on the the basis of your politics. ,,32
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In a 1938 article, Blum denied the comnent that "certain Radical
ministers" were consistently against him on nonintervention.
oontrary,

On

the

wrote Blum,

"their opinion was one of the determining
elements" to the August 7 decision. 33 Blum seems to be lying in two
respects.
fact

First,

against

same Radicals in the cabinet, such as Cot, were in

nonintervention.

responsibility for
reluctant.

Second,

the decision,

Blum

assumes

full

though in truth he was originally

Why did Blum respond to the oamment in this way? For one,

the accusation

implied,

"fiction".

Also,

to believe

the

to Blum,

that French democracy was

a

the French decision-makers on August 7 had grounds
international

accords

nonintervention plan would be observed.

brought

about

b¥

the

In short, it should only be

necessary to know that tqe decision was finalized by the cabinet. 34 To
divide the Popular Front into its component parts

is

immaterial

to

Blum, since only one policy decision must emerge.
If

the Radical Party was

policy, was Blum's

awn

not the only determinant to Blum's

Socialist Party at all influential?

What was

the SFIO's influence on the policy of nonintervention? TO what extent
did it affect Blum
The

focus

(and

the future of the party)?

of discussion on oonservative pressure on Blum has

often obscured the tensions which existed among
which were

acutely felt

by their

thorough Colton overlooks Paul Faure,
nonintervention.

Faure

represented

Blum faced, of wanting to support

the

the Socialists

leader, Blum.
a

and

Even the usually

socialist who did

support

the very real Socialist dilemma
struggling

Spain, and also maintain domestic and foreign peace.

new Republic of
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Blum and Faure held the diverse elements of the party together.
But although

the SFIO united under Blum in

the

Rassemblement

Populaire, the increased international tension began to pull the party
apart. 35 Both Blum and Faure, who represented the majority center of
the Party still spoke of disarmament
advocate

in 1933,

but Blum began

to

a

tripartite defensive alliance of France, England, and
in early 1935. 36 Faure, however, was an uncompromising

Russia,
pacifist;

refused to consider the use of force unless France
herself was attacked. 37 Domestic political tensions also split the two

leaders.

he

Blum, for instance,

had

resolutely endorsed

the general

strike of February 12, 1934, called against the fascist leagues, over
the objections of Faure, who feared the national guard. 38 In addition,
"Paul Faure never forgot that he was already one of the leaders of the
left of the party when Blum was still bnmersed in the troubled waters
of the union sacrie. ,,39
The

small

revolutionary

left

indistinguishable fram the Communists.
defend

of

the SFIO was almost

Jean zyromski

was

to

the Soviet Union militarily if necessary, while Marceau Pivert

denounced provoking war, including with Germany.

He resigned from the

Popular Front government in February 1937 in opposition
credits
the

ready

passed.

~rking

Never

~uld

to the war

he help "furnish arms to the enemies of

class ••• The Rassemblement Populaire

was

not created

to

make the proletariat swallow the pill of military credits and national
unity. 1140 But he did discreetly support the nonintervention agreement
because of his pacifism. 4l The Spanish War was but one
brief

issue

in the

history of the Popular Front that eventually led the SFIO to a
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"public split, which ruined the SFIO as a viable political party.,,42
That decisive

issue was Munich and the problem of possible war in

1938.
The oamplexity of party disunity between 1933 and 1938 cannot be
underestimated.

The Popular Front was

Socialists had

elected at a

to reconcile at least three important threats:

threat to the domestic peace of France, the threat
Europe,

and

time when

to

the

the peace of

above all the threat of rival mystiques on the Left and

Right vying for the same consti tuences.

Marcus does not see these as

reconcilable:
For the socialists, the problem of mystique vs.
politique remained acute.
This
interplay of
Socialist ideals and French politics has furthered
the development of a number of distinct socialist
mystiques, many of them operating within the SFIO
under the appearance of a cammon denominator of
class-war
formulas.
Contradictions
at this
fundamental level made perrnanen~3contradictions of
policies virtually a necessity.
The Communists and the Radicals were better able, during the interwar
period, to separate mystique from politique.
set

their

The Communists clearly

priority as anti-fascism, while the Radicals were loosely

organized and distrusted doctrinaire leadership anyway.44
In the middle, Blum was essentially groping
unity between
patriotism.
he

~stique

and politique.

for

the

applause,

from

justifiable

He found that synthesis in

His rhetoric was often vague as a result.

shouted over

a

For . example,

the podium of the Place de la

Nation on July 14, 1936, "The object of the Rassernblement Populaire is
to furnish new reasons to defend it.
revolutionary

tradition.

That

That is how to revive the great

is why the day of July 14 is at once

the celebration of the Revolution and yours.,,45
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Although he continued to assert that the Popular Front coalition
saved France from the "condition of Franco's Spain," he regretted
confusion

that separated Socialism from the people, especially on the

issue of national defense.
\~uld

have

remain

the

been

better

In 1941, he
off

came

to

believe

the

Party

to have openly divided, rather than to

"internally split ••• condemned

to

pcMerlessness

silence," as it was at the eve of W:>r Id War II.

and

almost

Between 1936 and 1938

the Party led a humiliated, suspect existence, of a
sort that no one could perceive its presence.
Surely, it .would have been better had a frank break
separated the irreconcilable elements.
The event
should have been the proof; the popular masses
would have re-formed
around
those
who
saw
clearly ••• To that, I had already ~nfessed, but the
religion of unity was too strong.
His judgment on the unity of the SFIO could apply more generally
to

the

French

Left of

Conmunists, the Socialists,
become

a

Popular

Front

the

am

interwar

years.

the Radicals

to

The
"see

failure of the
clearly,"

to

in spir it as well as in name, precluded the

possibility of a strong stand on the Spanish Civil War

issue.

This

stalemate in unity ultbnately facilitated the 1940 collapse of France.
Wrote Blum,

"At

the hour when the nation was waiting for an aweal,

for a rallying cry, none was heard from our ranks.,,47
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CHAPl'ER 5

Blum and the French Military

historian of French

An

foreign policy,

Robert Young,

has

recently ·shared striking evidence on Blum's relations with the French
military:
The stunning fact is that
in this
crucial
three-week period, preceding the nonintervention
decision, the government failed to consult the
French chiefs of staff on the precise nature of the
strategic menace or on the ki~s of operations
which could be mounted against it.
Young concludes fran this that "while prepared to justify his policy
in

terms of military exigencies, it seems unlikely that (Blum) was so

susceptible to their dictates.,,2 To what extent was Blum in fact
influenced

by

the "strategic menace" of the Spanish Civil War? What

"lessons" did the French military derive fran the Spanish War?
Blum exert

sufficient authority over the military?

The Spanish Civil War had
foreign diplanacy.

Did

If not, why not?

two main ramifications

for

French

The first was that it put new strains on any kind

of French-Italian accord.

The Popular Front

had

departed

from

its
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ideology in hesitatingly declining to aid a fellow leftist government.
Given

the predicament of the Blum goverrnnent, now bitterly denounced

by all communists and many socialists, it was inconceivable to press
on with an alliance with Italy.3
The second

ramification of the Civil War, and subject of this

chapter, was more strategic.

Since France was to discontinue courting

Italy (particularly after the announcement of the Rome-Berlin axis
the Fall of 1936),

in

she would have to reinforce her troops on the

Spanish border , at the expense of divisions against Germany,

in

the

event of a rebel victory.4 Furthermore, Blum was quick to identify the
threat of a

tightening of cammunications and access lanes between

France and North Africa.

"Fascist" control over the Gibraltar straits

b¥ means of German and Italian naval bases in the Balearics and the
Canaries was

an "extremely grave danger not only for France, but for
England," Blum apprised his Labour Party friend Noel-Baker. 5 There
\fiOuld be no guarantee

that France could ferry her North African
troops, without changing the mobilization plan. 6
These concerns led Blum and British Foreign Minister Eden

conclude

that

if

the spanish goverrnnent won,

situation would remain the same.
eject

foreign

troops

If

the

from Spain.

rebels

the

the

international

won,

Franco might

"Not until he proved willing to

cooperate with Germany and Italy against French
Mediterranean would

interests

above

all

the

in the

risks of neutrality overshadow the risks of

intervention." 7 Conversely, premature intervention would
risks,

to

threat of

run greater

international war.

Second,

intervention might prejudice Franco in favor of Germany and Italy, not
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lead him to evict those pJWers.
divert France

Finally, a mili tary oper ation w:::>uld

fram the far greater dangers over the Rhine. 8 Thus the

consequences of intervention appeared much more hazardous

than

those

of nonintervention.
This scenario was influenced by the French military.
a

rebel victory.

Andre" Blumel, Bltml' s chef de cabinet, reported to

the American charge Wilson that "the opinion of
advisers

was

It foresaw

the French military

in general pessimistic as to the chances of the success

of the Spanish Government.

The Spanish Governmental forces had plenty

of enthusiasm but no discipline or military order. ,,9
The sympathies of the French military to either party in
Spanish war were strangely conflicting and ambiguous.
Noel-Baker

of

the

~trategic

danger

of

the

After Bltml told

a Franquist-Italian

rapprochement in the Mediterranean, Noel-Baker asked, "Do you have the
support of your military authorities in this regard?" Bltml answered:
I don't know exactly what our army chief-of-staff
thinks. I'm not sure he's totally convinced, but I
can tell you, assure you, that our major general of
the £a-vy, Admiral Dar Ian , thinks exactly as I
do .••
~

important cabinet meetings, July 25 and August 1, on the possible

implications of French involvement in the Spanish Civil War, and Bltml
admits to being unaware of the positions of his generals!
On

that

the armed forces, however,

"for

General Gamelin later

admi tted

reasons of sentiment and conviction, the sympathies of the

soldiers were always with Franco. ,,11 But AndrdBltmlel had told Wilson
that

although

the French army officers were

instinctively unsympathetic to the aims of

"in the majority

the Bltml government

in

65
France,

and

could not

by the wildest stretch of the imagination be

suspected of any

natural

government

Spain to put down

the

efforts of

the

Left

the mili tary revolt

there, "

nonetheless "for reasons of a technical nature related to the

problem

of

in

sympathy with

French

security

the French military and naval command were heart

and soul in favor of the ultimate triumph of the Spanish

The

"technical

reasons"

referred

to

Goverrnnent."

involved the difficulties "in

which France would be placed if communications with North Africa's
reservoir

of men

and

foodstuffs

were

cut off

from continental

France. ,,12
It would seem, then, that the strategic
cancelled out

the military's

symphathies

bnperatives of France
with the rebels.

If the

French military could hav.e been swayed either way, Blum must have been
swayed by factors other than the views of the military,
domestic politics and the British influence.

such as

by

For instance, Pierre Cot

of Aviation pointed out that the accusation of French opponents that
intervention would provoke German and Italian reaction "was not
legally

unacceptable

but actually

intervening anyway.13 But
resulting

the

inaccurate";

possibility of

only

these powers were

a Blum resignation,

fram increasing public, cabinet and parliamentary division,

and Delbos ' s and Gamelin's own opposition to "ideological crusading",
weighed more

heavily than

the logic of merely being able to openly

sell arms to a friendly goverrnnent. 14
Anti-communism also blinded the conservative British and French
elements

to the strategic threat of a potentially fascist Spain.

British felt that non-involvement would

probably lead

to

a

The
rebel
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and

victory,

from Spain.

then an ouster of all foreigners , including Communists,

Sir S. Hoare explained further:

When I

speak of "neutrality" I
mean strict
that is to say, a situation in which
the Russians neither officially or unofficially
give help to the Comnllnists. On no account must we
do anything to bolster up Ccmnunism in Spain,
particularly when it is remembered that Communism
in Portugal, to which it ~uld probably spread and
particularly in Lif!?,n, would be a grave danger to
the British Empire.
neutr~lity,

The French army, sympathetic to Franco,
measure

to deterrrdne

victory.
Italy.

the 'consequences of a German-Italian-supported

TO the

retired general Castelnau, a hero of the First World
in Spain was

"between Muscovite bar bar ism and

Western Civilization." He coined

officers.,,16 The
tanks,

a

technicians I ,

~uld

the term "Frente Crapular" in the

"the rrost widely read daily paper

Echo de Paris,

I

in some

Like Britain, it counted on the rapprochement possible with

War, the conflict

few

also failed

aJIK)l1g French

historian William Shirer asserts, "A few planes, a

few batteries
rushed over

of
the

artillery,
oorder,

a

scattering

of

as Bltnn had fIrst planned,

have enabled the Spanish Republic to quash the

rebellion

in a

few days or weeks, before the aid from Italy and Germany, which were
further away, could come by sea to save the military junta. ,,19 Jean
Zay and Pierre Cot and other Young Turks in the government inclined
this

assessment.

Spanish republicans
had

Cot
~uld

to

said "leaving the French frontier open to the
have been their salvation." The German army

only just achieved parity with the French, and Italy was still

exhausted from the Ethiopian campaign the year
World War

before.

A risk of

II in 1936 rather than three years later hardly existed to
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Cot. 18 But General Gamelin did
voluminous memoires
1938.

until

even mention Spain

in

his

the Republican cause was all but lost in

At that point in March 1938

ministry Gamelin

not

under Blum's

second

short-lived

finally saw the necessity of a "diplomatic means to

separate Germany and Italy" from Spain. 19
Irony lies in General Gamelin's priding himself before Blum on
keeping

the military

beginning to "sprout the
Franco during

the

"ab::>ve politics"
seeds of

while Petain and Laval were

authoritarianism"

in supporting

Spanish Civil War. 20 While Blum reassured Gamelin

that he understocxl the "gravity" of

the German

threat

in Europe,

former Prime Minister Laval and Marshal pefain dealt secretly with the
Nazi

government through Salamanca.

Franco, the German

Arnbas~ador

On April 13, 1937, Laval met with

in Spain reported.

The French statesman brought out the
serious
internal situation in France and the imminence of
a Corrmunist movement in that country, and stated
that he was in touch with Doriot, Colonel La Rocque
(lfladers of two rightist parties), and Marshal
petain. • •• M. Laval was of the -""opinion that the
salvation of France lay in a Petain government am
that the Marshal was determined to assume this
responsibility, but that President (sic) Blum, wham
he compared to Alcala Zamora, and with wham they
were secretly working ~ this end, did not seem
inclined to accept it.
But,

to

be fair, P~tain did not openly resist Blum, even at the 1938

meeting on Spain.

Pertinax recalls:

Not a word did he utter against the Jew, whom he
jailed, condemned am abandoned to the Nazis. Yet
at the same time the Jew was
importunate,
repeatedly asking him, seeing that he was silent,
"Are you thoroughly in agreement Marshal? •• Haven ' t
you any objections to express?" "None whatever, Mr.
Prime Minister, none whatever
And he answered in
a tone of deferential regard.

22
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"Obviously, "

adds Pertinax,

"pttain did

not

speak as he felt and

./

thought. II In the sumner of 1936, Petain met
., a former Br i tish minister,
Lord Mottistone, and remarked, "We have a rotten government and I want
to tell you that the French people won't
that Petain did

not

fight."

Pertinax

remarked

change between 1936 and 1938; "he always stood

where Anglophobia, oounterrevolutionary passion, and defeatism met. 1123
How much control did Blum have over the military,
he

have

had

the

support of

in Madrid

addressed Blum:

attache

to

and

the French

liThe King of France would have

intervened. ,,24 But the sovereign of a country is not like
of

Would

the French armed forces in Spain had

intervention led to war? A French military
embassy

then?

the

leader

a coalition, particularly if that leader is committed to democracy
enhancing

to

government
ideology.

the ,c redibility of

the

new

socialist-headed

by not appearing to be militantly crusading the socialist
The unknowns of intervention were too grave to

risk;

Blum

was

not bold on military aid to Spain until 1938, after the Anschluss
a""1d the fall of Guernica and Saragossa. 25
The military's lack of commitment to the Spanish cause may have
lain not

in private

sympathies

nor

in ignorance of the strategic

interest France had in a non-fascist aligned Spain but in a
German

rearmament,

and

the

Though the Blum government

did embark on a massive rearmament program, the Left's

rhetoric was

arrl the military doctr ine was still defensive.

1935, when Paul Reynaud advocated
policy,

of

conviction that keeping allies were the

lynchpins to France ' s oollective security.

still disarmament

fear

that France

In

change her mili tary

General Maurin, the Minister of War, had answered, IIWhen one
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has spent millions to have good and solid fortifications , one does not
commit

the

folly

of

going

beyond

these

fortifications

to

who-kn~s-what kind of adventure.,,26
Had the French military establishment believed as had Colonel de
Gaulle

in

the breakthrough powers of offensive weapons, particularly

in the hands of an enemy with superior resources ,
contrary,
France.

have
Thus

constituted
it was,

a

it would,

on

the

prediction of military disaster for

writes Young,

"that

the

high

conmand

reconsidered, then reaffirmed, its doctrine in 1936.,,27
If nonintervention was meant to enhance France's waning prestige
before

her East European allies,

occurred.
arms

the opposi te,

Poland, for example, wanted France to

industry with prototypes as

w~ll

The generals also

~rtance.

see how Russia could act directly against Germany given
between

the

two

countries,

Russia'S

Poland, and the ongoing purges of their generals.

her

Blum consulted his

generals and they refused to supply the prototypes.

states

any change,

help subsidize

as money.

did not consider the USSR of prime strategic

if

shaky
After

They did not
the

wall of

relations with
learning of

the generals' opinions on Poland, Blum, exasperated, told Daladier and
Gamelin:
One cannot live this way.
Weare linked by an
alliance with a state and a people, and we have so
little confidence in them that we hesitate to
deliver them arms, designs, projects, for f2~ they
will betray us and deliver us to the enemy.
What "lessons" did the French military learn fran observing
new warfare

in Spain?

General Arroengaud

battles in Spain "confirm our

CMn

wrote

the

in 1937 that the

experience (of the First World War) ,
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the value of the dispositions we undertook to prevent a quick
when

the war

0f

movement t urned to t he war

focussing on German speed
explained

am

0f

concentration

attack"

··
'30 Instead of
att rltlon.

in Spain,

the generals

the victories of the offensive there to inadequate numbers

of defensive weapons or to the certain peculiarities inherent
war in Spain.

to

the

Conversely, the successes of artillery, anti-tank guns,

and anti-aircraft artillery were used to confirm the correctness of
the French war doctrine. 31 General Beaufre recounts in his memoires of
an instance in June or July 1936 when British Chief of

the Imperial

Staff Deverell asked General Gamelin what he thought of the German
tanks in Spain.
our policy

Gamelin replied, "All our information indicates

is the right one.

that

The German tanks, too lightly armored,

are scrap iron.,,32
All the same, the battles in Spain demonstrated to Armengaud the
need for a
lesson,

"counter-offensive on fortified

The principle

to Armengaud, was similar to what was learned on the western

Front in the last months of World War
the

lines."

I:

"Our idea is confirmed that

eventual adversary of our country will not attack, if there is no

hope of

surpr ise. "

In other

w::>rds,
well-organized on :the defensive. 33

the French oorders must be

How did he evaluate the new air forces of Germany, Italy, and
the Soviet Union?

The spanish Civil War

instances of extensive air raids.
the defensive

was one of

the

first

Likewise, the general repeated that

strategy for aviation was the lesson.

The nationalist

air force in Biscaye, for instance, was all-p:Merful "when it was not
countered" by goverrunent planes and anti-aircraft defense. 34 What was
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the message to France?

To

catch up in aviation.

the Spanish Civil War maneuvers,

He concluded

that peace

from

in Europe lay in an

"equilibrium of air forces," which must be achived "at any price. ,,35
In a

word, instead of emphasizing a positive solution to the problem

of German rearmament, the French Generals
cabinet)

(and members of Blum's

reemphasized, using the Spanish example, the deterrent value

of a strong coalition defense.
The field
per ipheral

of military economy
this

to

study,

is quite new,

it may shed

some

and although

light as to why the

military behaved as it did toward involvement in the Spanish war.

To

what extent were the internal responses of the Blum government as well
as of all other French interwar governments, predicated upon the slow
progress of an

industri~

government policy

strategy for wartime?

To

.what extent was

on Spain influenced by the export and investment

interests of French armament, shipbuilding and aircraft
Before

industries?36

the Spanish Civil War, France bought a considerable amount of

iron from Spain.
times of war,

That market was replaced by North Africa.
due

But

to potential difficulties in conmunicating with

North Africa, it would be nore practical to deal with Spain.
also

exported

in

copper,

20, 000

tons,

indispensable for

defense. 37 A definite correlation between

these

Spain
national

interests and. the

attitudes of Blum and the French military is difficult to establish.
But Socialist leader Paul Faure has
mater iel manufacturers as

"the .t rue

cynically described

Potemkin of Russia

war

internationalists." Blum does

point out that the French war industrialist Ie Creusot
Ambassador

the

tried

to get

to pressure Blum not to nationalize
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French industry, promising to sell Russia more arms if nationalization
did not occur. 38
The French military differed over
clear

partisans of Franco.

for

their

defensive military doctrine

elaborate border preparations,

French reserves on the German border
Still others

were content

Some generals were

Others thought the risks of intervention

were too great, especially since
called

Spain.

to

maintaining the bulk of

to resist

stand pat,

a strong Germany.

though noting

the new

offensive tank and airforce strategies, reconvinced of the need for

a

strong French defense.
What

if

the Popular Front had resigned over Spain? What would

Daladier' s authority as Minister of National Defense have meant to the
military if the president of the Radical Party moved
to

from government

opposition?49 The air force, in spite of Pierre Cot, was inclined

to the right.

The navy, in spite of Darlan, "was the body which was

soon

the

to be

framework

for

the most

reactionary regime

in

contemporary France: Vichy. ,,40 We know l i ttle about the

army except

that Marshal Petain later became ambassador to Franco.

One general

accused the Popular Front of encouraging laziness

and

"incapable

cornnanders."

Because the workers got out of hand, the former bosses
unlearned the art of giving oammands. 41
Blum later claimed that France was "on the

~

/

d'etat, a counterpart to the Franco

reactionary circles,

~

eve of a military

de force. Industrial and

infuriated by the passage of social laws, would

have utilized this (the Spanish Civil War) as a pretext (for a
I had a presentiment of it at the time.

~).

Since then I knCM it.,,42
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The French rrdlitary, however, has usually been included in the
long list of reactionary groups, at least from the perspective of

the

Spanish Civil War, than as a force to contend with in its own right.
The attitude of the military toward
Spain and
understood.

the generals'

the

strategic

threat posed

by

influence on Blum remains little known and

What is clear is that Blum, like the military

(exciuding

de Gaulle), did not consider the possibility of a defensive war fought
in Spain on behalf of the Spanish Republic, to counter the threat of a
third fascist front on the French border.
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rnAPTER 6

The British Influence on French Nonintervention

The outoame of the Spanish War was settled in
London, Paris, Rane, Berlin - at any rate, not in
Spain.
- G. Orwelll

The extent of British influence on the decision of
.
/
Prerru.er
Leon
BI um not

to

the French

intervene on the Republican side of the

Spanish Civil War is perhaps the most controversial issue in the study
of Blum's action as a statesman.
diplomatic papers of

the

Revisionists

have

reexamined

the

tilne, made publicly available in the last

twenty years, and have found that the allegations of British coercion
were excuses to divert attention from the tense domestic politics.

As

Young writes, if Britain swung the French decision-makers, it was more
as icing on the French g$teau. 2 But this interpretation still does not
answer the question of how
and

how

did Blum

interpret

himself always assumed
agreement. 3 On

~rtant

the

was the issue of British support,

and respond to Br i tish pressure.

responsibility

for

the

Blum

nonintervention

the British side, the Secretary of the Foreign Office

Anthony Eden, likewise denied the French acted on his government's
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directive,

and

added,

"I

should

have

been

nonintervention was my proposal, as I considered

glad
it

say

to

that

the .best

which

could have been devised in the circumstances. ,,4
Other

witnesses,

importance Blum and
alliance

.

and

to

however,

Delbos
the

looked

as

if

the

preventing Hitler

attached

almost

sympathy to the rebels.

such

as
to

Pierre

strengthening

"unconscious

"Rightly or

Cot, stressed the
the

British

of

British

reflection"

wrongly,"

Cot

explained,

"it

nonintervention policy would be the only way of
from

aiding Franco. ,,5 But would England

have

isolated France had an international conflict arisen?
Whom

do we believe, Blum, Eden or Cot?

First, Blum's goals for

better Anglo-French relations will be examined.
Britain harbored reservations on intervention.
to

deterrrdne

whether

Next, we will see why
Finally, we will

seek

Blum and France could have proceeded to act on

their own initiative, if Blum had done this, and why.
France just after World War I was "the
continent

of

greatest power

on

the

Europe," remembered Shirer. 6 She was rich, maintained a

proud army on the Rhine and controlled colonies in parts of Africa and
Asia.
allies

But by the 1930s, France's credibility as
on

the

continent

declined.

to

impose

In

1935,

her

Laval

had

sanctions on Italy over the invasion of Ethiopia,

against Britain's wishes, just as London likewise had done
condemn

over

When the Popular Front assumed

power, relations with Great Britain were shaky.
refused

protector

Germany over

little

to

the occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936.

Great Britain also signed an agreement to
Germany without consulting France.

lbnit

naval

weapons

with

Same British conservative circles
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even favored an Anglo-Gerrnan entente over one with the leftist French
government. 7
Meanwhile,

a Belgium nervous

about

both French and British

inaction, as well as with the powerlessness of the League of Nations
and

the

failure

of

the ongoing disarmament talks, decided to both

break her alliance with France and Britain and ask
her

neutrality.

them to preserve

The Petite Entente of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and

Ranania worried about France's ability to protect it both fran Germany
in Czechoslovakia's case, and in the cases of Poland and Romania, from
Russia, with wham they feared France had a conflicting alliance. 8
The lowered status of France
Premier of France.

"anguished"

the

new visionary

Blum sensed in the turn of events

a
new sign, a new symptom of that type of
progressive
breakdown of all our European
positions, not only materially but politically.
Symbolically, it wa~ a sign of change and the
prophesy of danger.
The

sun was

likewise setting on the British Empire.

turned inward while she strove to maintain her political and
ties with

her

colonies.

navy,

her

army,

economic

After World War I, Britain's finances were

depleted and unemployment high.
great

Britain

like

Though Britain still maintained her
that of the United States, was totally

disbanded. lO Eden on his side criticized the resultant growing British
isolationism ·as "unrealistic," especially after Hitler's aggression in
the Rhineland in March 1936.

In truth, the League of Nations had came

to "depend for its survival upon close Anglo-French cooperation. ,,11
Thus Blum set out to strengthen the alliance with Britain, which
had already begun to revive with

the

previous

Rad i cal-COnser vat ive
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Sarraut government. 12 Blum confided

to Eden, the British statesman

reports, his fear that British public opinion:
was at the moment making the same mistake about
Hitler as French public opinion had made about
Italy; the latter had attempted
to secure
Mussolini's support against Hitler, and now it
looked as though we were attempting to secure
Hitler's support against Mussolini. I 1jsured Blum
that no such intention was in our mind.
Britain had

strategic as well as

ideological

standing clear of Spain during the Civil War.
1936 an envoy described

As

interests in

early as June

23,

"the chances of parliamentary government

surviving" as "very slight." He added,

in the

same memo to

the

Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs Eden, that
British firms in Spain have had their share of the
difficulties resulting from the labour unrest and
from the recent Government legislation, and our
Embassy has been active in protesting to the
Spanish Government against .the application to
British firms of the Provisions of the Decree of
February 29th, the enforcement of which has been
placed in the hands of popularly elected local
cammissi~ns,
from whose decision there is no
appeal.
The envoy noted the grCMing "anti-foreign feeling" in Spain and
made

quite

clear

the British

interest

in a

stable,

friendly

government:
So long as the Spanish Government fails to put its
own house in order and to regain its authority,
there is little hope of obtainigg any real
satisfaction for British interests.
According

to

Eden

and

to

most

British

historians,

nonintervention did not originate from British pressure,
Britain entrenched in the Franquist camp.
was

nor was

And while Eden's first move

to ensure the safe exodus of Br i tish subj ects from Spain, he told
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the Spanish Ambassador on July 25 that the British government

"~uld

not obstruct the provision of supplies," including arms and munitions,
to the Spanish Government. 16 Britain also continued to sell oil to the
Spanish Republic. 17
If Eden

can be

believed

and Great Britain did not in fact

initiate the French nonintervention policy or

sympathy with Franco,

Britain nonetheless made clear her unwillingness to be on the side of
a

"conmunist

takeover. " Admiral Lord Chatfield had

assumed

the

conflict in Spain was between the equally unsympathetic ccmnunists and
fascists.

By contrast, his French counterpart, Admiral Darlan, tried

unsuccessfully to convince him a democratic government did exist

in

Spain and mentioned the possibility of London-Paris mediation to save
1't • 18

Thomas Jones, former Deputy Secretary to the British cabinet who
remained close with Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, noted in his diary
on July 27:

" ••• S.B. was much affected by the Spanish

told Eden yesterday

'I

that on no account, French or other, must he

brings us in to fight on the
later,

troubles.

Winston Churchill,

side of

the Russians.' ,,19 Four

days

then a conservative MP, wrote Corbin, the

French Ambassador in London, "I am sure if France sent airplanes, etc.
to the present Madrid Government, and the Germans and Italians pushed
in from the other angle, the dominant forces here

~uld

have been with

Germany and Italy, and estranged from France." 20
"On

no

account must we do anything to bolster up Conmunism in

Spain," said Sir S.

Hoare,

"especially since

it could

spread

to

Lisbon" which "would be a grave danger to the British Empire. ,,21 Hoare
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and Chatfield surmised that in the event England's interests in the
Mediterranean and on the Cape routes were

endangered,

Britain

could

easily "send ships, at short notice" but they would be "astonished" if
Italy and Germany would attempt an attack because of their willingness
to

take part

in

the ongoing Locarno talks in London and to resume

"friendly relations.,,22
The most logical argument,
French perspective,

for

and

I

think

convincing

fran

the

nonintervention, was addressed to Delbos by

Sir George Clerk on August 7.

In fact, according to Dreifort, it

had

"a significant impact" on Delbos's commitment that evening to a formal
French-directed policy of nonintervention.

Clerk had asked him "how

he was sure that the government in Madrid was the real government
not

the

screen

behind ' which the most anarchistic elements in Spain

were directing events?" He pointed out no law
Madrid.

and

and

order

existed

in

But here was the clincher:
I must put before him the danger of any action
which might definitely oammit the French government
to one side of the conflict and to make more
difficult the close cooperation between ou two
countries which was .called for by this crisis. 23

Delbos thanked him for his openness and that he "wished nothing more
than

that

the

two

Governments

should act

together as closely as

possible." Delbos viewed Franco's possible Mediterranean concessions
to Germany and Italy with "anxiety." Clerk responded

••• 1 had reason to believe that the extremists in
the Government were putting increasing pressure on
M.
Blum and I felt sure what I said might
strengthen the hands of the moderate and sober
elements.
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After

this

interview the Foreign Office noted that Sir G.

Clerk ' s

language "is approved and appears to have had gCXJd result.,,24
Still, it seems TImpossible to
French were

the

impression

too . easily convinced by Britain.

British "rubber stamp":
other

avoid

course of

the

Eden was clear on the

Blum "and Delbos knew only too well that

action would sharply divide France,

intervention by the great powers could lead to a
agreed with

that

any

while open

European war.

We

this French decision of policy.,,25 In Eden's view, then,

Britain's agreement with Blum had

00

bearing on whether or not France

would adopt a nonintervention policy.
So why

did

the

gain popular credence?

legend of British pressure on Blum and Delbos
I am inclined to agree with Young and Carlton,

that the British position was a pretext for the

Po~ar

Front.

Just as Blum's self-confessed lack of consultation
with his military advisers raises doubt about the
importance he appeared to attribute to strategic
concerns, so too the lack of British pressure in
late July-early August simply must weaken the
contention that Fran ultimately bowed to British
pressure and demands. 26
According to Young, the Popular Front, like the previous Sarraut
government, took advantage of the French citizen's legitimate concern
for
from

national

security and the British alliance, to detract attention

the .potential

split of

the Popular Front

cabinet.

The

unsuccessful Darlan mission represented the failure of the government
to do so.
nowhere
1935. 27

Britain hardly forced France into nonintervention and came
near

the

kind of armrtwisting used on Laval on Ethiopia in
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Young's theory is convincing and attractive,
take

into account

that Blum himself

from

it

fails

to

did not hesitate to publicly

assume the responsibility of nonintervention,
Judging

but

and

why he

the way Blum withstood opposition

did

so.

throughout

his

political career -- he was even physically assaulted in February 1936
it seems unlikely Blum would have adopted an opportunistic excuse
for the policy.

The Popular Front foreign policy objectives

enunciated on June

23

that

he

before the Senate clearly indicated that the

then unforseen policy in Spain had a precedent in

the Popular

Front

Platform.
We do not intend to hold any crusade other than the
reconciliation of peoples, without exclusion.
Propaganda or the battle for whateve political
system must not be the pretext for war. 28
(Significantly,

he mentioned Jaures a few times).

nonintervention policy can be seen as a
a~d

not

as

deliberate,

In this light, the
inevitable act,

a desperate effort to save the Popular Front, along with

its new social laws, from falling.
But would Britain really have abandoned Blum had he decided
go ahead with intervention? Cot thought not.
England would not have abandoned France in case of
actual danger, because her interest would have
forbidden
such a rove; it would have been
impossible for her to remain out of a European war
that was bound to result in a redistribution of
international power.' She would have followed us
unwillingly, but she would have followed. Instead
of an Anglo-French policy directed by the English
conservatives, we would have had an international
policy oriented by the Popular Front am suffered
by the British conservatives. Democracy and the
peoples of the B2~tish empire would have gained
from the change.

to
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Also,

given what we know fram Britain's participation in the Lacarno

talks of 1925 and July 1936,
decline,

and

her

rising

from Britain's

economic and military

interest in the friendship of a democratic

France (not strongly allied to the Soviet Union) and to the Churchill
after

1936,

taken

the German

intervention

it

is

likely Britain would at the very least not have
side.

But

how effective would

that

British

have been? Great Britain's armaments production did not

reach parity with France until 1938.

The

nonintervention

agreement

"gained time" for Britain. 3D
Hindsight

tells

us

that nonintervention was wrong because the

fascist forces triumphed eventually, that Hitler
strengthened,

and Britain and France

Secretary of State Cordell Hull reflected,
valid only

humbled.
"this

war.

Mussolini

Yet

were

as American

argument would

be

if the peace-loving nations, including the United States,

had been prepared militarily and psychologically
effort

and

toward maintaining peace

to abandon

their

and embark on a general preventive

Such was not the case.,,3l And who was going to risk a preventive

war in 1936? France and Britain (and Russia), the protectors of peace
in Europe, were not.
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CONCLUSION

Did Blum react consistently with his Socialist principles in the
agreement not

to

intervene

in the Spanish Civil War? Did he act

reluctantly, bowing to pressure?
First, it is clear ,that Blum adopted the nonintervention policy
with

the greatest reluctance. Most of Blum's compatriots, primarily

his former ministers Pierre Cot and Andre Blumel, and Fernando de los
Rios,

Jiminez

de Asua,

and Julio Just of the Spanish Republican

government, had only praise and sympathy for Blum's humaneness.
separate

They

the treaty fram him, and characterize it as the sum total of

domestic and foreign pressures on the Popular Front. l

Pierre Mendes

France was Blum's only close associate who continued to believe
military aid in July and August 1936 would have effectively benefitted
the Republic.
leaders,

This is to forget that at the time, all of

except

significant.

for

Negrin,

did not themselves consider the affair

Also, this focus an military aid excludes other formulas

of intervention:

the simple opening of borders to free trade , or

immediate execution of France's 1935 war
Spain. 2

the Madrid

materiel

the

treaties with
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To others, that Blum suffered deeply because of
events does

not excuse him.

the

turn of

Colton and Lacouture agree with Alvarez

del Vayo's judgment:
That he felt this despair attested to his deep
sensitivity but does not absolve Leon Blum from the
political responsibility he incurred when he gave
his name and that of the Frenc~ Socialist Party to
the farce of non-intervention.
Pertinax criticizes Blum's intellectualism and his escapes into
abstractions.

Blum closed himself off from the public:

"He had

to

painfully gird himself whenever he felt action had to be taken.- He is
the French Pythagoras.

He believed

that divine

numbers

rule

the

world. ,,4
Although nonintervention revealed itself to be indeed a farce,
Blum acted fully conscious of the forces that could drive the country
and

the

thin hope of international peace asunder.

The Spanish Civil

War divided the Left in France, whose support Blum had to have in
order to govern at all. 5 Same Left Socialists and Communists, such as
the Comnunist leader Maurice Thorez, denounced nonintervention,

"that

juridical monstrosity which is assassinating our Spanish brothers.,,6
Others, such as Paul Faure, were ardent proponents of peace at
price.

any

The majority of the Left, including Blum, continued to believe

in nonintervention as

the expression of

ability of grouped nations

to

collective security, the

effectively pressure

the aggressor.

Unilateral action of France in Spain would risk the British alliance,
the

touchstone,

Furthermore,

rightly or

wrongly,

of French

foreign

policY.

to Jaure\ian Socialists, the unity of nations would lead

to world peace which would in turn lead to Socialist revolution.

The
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pacifism

of

the Right was

simpler:

why

fight

to preserve a

potentially Communist government? Above all, in order

to

understand

the domestic turmoil of France, one must appreciate what Cordell Hull
had termed the "paralysis" that gripped Europe after

the devastation

and demoralization of the previous war.
Blum's
faced, as he

socialism was conditional
had

always

to

the
changing forces metaphor he put forth in 1919. 7
Would Jaures
" have

explained since

the

intervened?

In a

time and crisis he
"vectorial sum"

of

speech at Scissons on

November 15, 1936, Blum answered no:
"""'
I told him: "But, Jaures,
aren't there noments
where war
is necessary! " And I cited sane
historical examples that had always obsessed me. I
reminded him of the per iod between February and
June 1848, which was one of the great historic
noments of a troubled Europe.. • • And I told
Jaures: "But, at such a mcment, wasn't it Lamartine
who was wrong, who betrayed the Republic and the
Revolution,
in proclaiming
a
policy
of
non-intervention.
The workers who, same weeks
later, fell on Paris in the barricades of June,
~uld
it have been better if they had gone to the
aid of Germany and Italy ••• " But Jaur~s answered:
"No! No! that -would not have been better. Any time
war can be avoided, it must be avoided. War is
evil! Nothing good and noble can come out of war!
It is not from war that humans learn goodness! It
is not war which is revolutionary, it is peace!,,8

Blum was torn in his own'mind over the issue of when war is or is not
acceptable.

Unfortunately, the absolute bmpossibility of negotiating

with a Hitler did not hit him until 1938,

after

the Anschluss,

the

concession of Czechoslovakia to Germany, and the victory of Franco in
Spain.

When it did, however, he did not

different outlook on national defense.

hesitate

to

formulate

a

In ~ l'echelle humaine, the
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culmination of his life's y,ork, written while
Vichy,

Blum

he

was

imprisoned
.,

by

finally and most eloquently resolved in his own mind the

problem <?f peace.

IIExperience teaches,1I he wrote, "that

in

dreadful

rnanents of his life, man only saves his life by risking it. 1I9
He

conceded

the

Europe, he continued in
preserve peace

than

reality of a IIEurope in arms." Given an armed

~ l'~helle

humaine, there is no other way

by a system of "armed mutual assistance" and by

pacts that are effective only when "each of the peoples
are

to

who

sign

it

resolved to honor it with their blood. ,,10 He disapproved of those

to

who refused to IIdie for Danzig" and perhaps silently referred
own actions during the Spanish Civil War.

his

He is a harsh critic of the

Left of the 30s:
The socialists and syndicalists were right to
preach peace, but they reduced it and were reduced
themselves by a tone of · false good sense and
egoism. Courage and the spirit of sacrifice are
not survivors of barbarism~ what is barbaric is the
object t~hwhich Humanity still applies them. (i.e.,
to war).
Blum

had

came

to recognize that the majority of the left during the

30s, himself included, shortsightedly sought peace without confronting
the issue of how to enforce it.
must

be

fought

that

peace

for, and that long-term goals could only be achieved

through squarely resisting
barbarism

The paradox was twofold:

threatens

the

present

II bar bar ism, "

a nation other than one's own.

even

if

that

The Blum of 1941

would have follCMed through and aided Spain.

But would the country have let him?
not illusory.

The risks of civil war were

Provincial conservatism still predominated in

1936~

the
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working class was still too poor and isolated to
revolution;

foment

and

to win

the Parliament on which the Popular Front relied was a

bastion of conservatism; even the Communist Party had turned moderate.
The nonintervention policy did not radically damage Blum's
before the people, as the Luna Park speech demonstrated.

authOrity

Fewer people

were against the policy than many would like to adrnit. 12
In

foreign affairs, as well as domestic, Blum faced the problem

of credibility:

how was he to instill confidence in a nation with its

first Socialist and its first Jewish Premier?
international war

the same

time,

threatened in 1936, all the more reason to turn to

an appeasement policy.
reoccupied

At

Italy had invaded Ethiopia

the Rhineland

in 1935;

Germany

in March 1936; Japan was later to join the

tripartite anticornintern 'pact with Germany and Italy; Stalin began the
violent purges in the USSR in the summer of 1936: and civil war

broke

out in Spain.
Resignation

was

nonintervention policy.
would

not

have

had

Blum's

one

viable

If Blum had intervened
the

to

have

the

mr,

he

and

would

have

been

Along with a large
the Ccmnunists,

the

challenged the succeeding government as

much as Blum himself had been pressured.
SFIO would

fallen,

the Republican cause.

fraction of the Radical Party,
Socialist Party would

in Spain,

the

Perhaps a SOCialist opposition

group in the Chamber, had Blum resigned or
advantageous

fully

to

undivided support of his constituency, his

cabinet, and least of all, Parliament.

more

alternative

Furthermore,

Blum and

the

have been spared the stain of the nonintervention policy.

The new social laws would probably not have been revoked in
of a united working class opposition.

the wake
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Ironically,

the Germans were

Republican victory.
21,

already prepared

to concede a

In a telegram to the Foreign Ministry on August

the German Ambassador to France remarked that if the arms

1936,

embargo did not materialize, Blum and DelOOs would no longer
to

risk

"give

the

be

able

growing domestic political pressure and would have to

unlimited

support

considerations of

the

to

geography alone,

Spanish

IIFrom

Government. II

deliveries from countries which

sympathize with the rebels could not compete with French support."
added

that

the

consequent

He

stream of Red Front volunteers to Spain

"would then assume such proportions

that

consequences

for

foreign

policy would be incalculable. 1I13
Why did Blum remain

in off ice, then, and succumb not to the

interventionists on the Left, as Germany feared, but seemingly
more

IIprudent"

stance? For one, the Spanish Government itself urged

Blum to stay in power.
lawyer,

a

According

vice president,

to Jiminez

and author of

Constitution, the spanish Government would
sympathetic Blum government,

than one more

Spanish interests. 14 Secondly,
genuinely viable.

the

de

Asua,

socialist

the Spanish Republican
rather

have

kept

outwardly hostile to

nonintervention policy seemed

Germany, as we have seen, agreed to the

policy for fear of French, British and Russian intervention.

Thirdly,

Blum did sincerely believe the policy preserved peace at home and

in

In Luna Park Blum said that only when he could no longer

reconcile his Socialist ideals, those of peace and the
social

the

Britain and the united States supported the policy,

along with the Soviet Union.

Europe.

a

to

classes

and

nations

hope

for

all

to cooperate, with his duty as France's
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leader, would he resign.

He almost did so in December 1936, when

the

Communists withheld their vote of confidence in the government due to
the Popular Front policy on Spain, but he remained after

his Spanish

fr iends repeatedly urged him to do so.
Blum cannot

judged,

be

various political,

danestic,

then, without taking into account the
and

ideological

influenced and limited Blum in 1936.

forces

that

both

The Spanish Civil War experience

taught Blum on the one hand, that with a more pragmatic, "Bismarckian,"
approach,

one

could correctly perceive the realities of the forces

that drive people and
limitations.

how a

leader

within

these

Only with this knowledge in mind can ideals be applied.

Socialism, like any other ideology, had
itself

could work

originated

of

came

in ,historical events.

attributed to Blum, it must
transformation

not

be

humanity.

If

too great
But

a

while

from

nowhere

any fault
faith
that

in

can be

the moral

faith,

through

nonintervention, led unwittingly to a defeated Republican Spain,
also helped

to

rally the French Resistance six years later.

toward Blum as

he was defending

"He was a prisoner on occupied soil and it was

though

bars

us." 15

of

in

himself before the Vichy

government:
the

it

Pierre

Mende's France remembers the "poignant feelings" of the free French
London

but

he who,

his cell, exhorted us, encouraged us, sustained
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